CVE-2026-134247 in SiYuaninfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/21/2026

SiYuan 3.8.0 before 3.8.10 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows anonymous attackers to read indexed asset text referenced only by publish-disabled attribute-view rows. Attackers can request /api/asset/getDocAssets on a public host document to obtain the leaked asset path, then query /api/search/getAssetContentByPath to retrieve the confidential file's full indexed text.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The vulnerability identified in SiYuan versions prior to 3.8.10 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the application's document management and search subsystems. This flaw, classified under CWE-269 as an Improper Privilege Context issue, allows unauthenticated or anonymous attackers to bypass intended security restrictions designed to protect private content. The core of the vulnerability lies in the inconsistent enforcement of authorization checks across different API endpoints that handle asset retrieval and document indexing. Specifically, while the user interface correctly respects a publish-disabled attribute-view setting for certain rows within documents, preventing them from being exposed through standard public sharing mechanisms, this restriction is not uniformly applied to the underlying backend APIs used for searching and retrieving indexed content.

The technical exploitation of this vulnerability involves a two-stage process that leverages the separation between document visibility controls and asset indexing logic. An attacker begins by targeting a host document that has been made publicly accessible via SiYuan's sharing features. Within this public document, there exist rows or blocks marked with a publish-disabled attribute-view setting, which are intended to remain hidden from external viewers. However, because the application indexes these assets for internal search functionality without adequately restricting access based on their visibility status in the UI layer, an attacker can query the /api/asset/getDocAssets endpoint associated with the public document. This API call returns metadata including the file paths of all assets referenced by that document, regardless of whether those specific references are marked as private or disabled for publishing.

Once the attacker obtains these asset paths through the initial API request, they proceed to the second stage of exploitation by querying the /api/search/getAssetContentByPath endpoint with one of the retrieved confidential file paths. This search-related API fails to verify if the original document containing the reference was authorized for public access or if the specific asset itself is protected from external retrieval. Consequently, the system returns the full indexed text content of the private asset, effectively bypassing the publish-disabled restriction entirely. This behavior indicates a fundamental architectural flaw where security policies defined at the presentation layer are not propagated to the data retrieval and search layers, creating an authorization bypass that compromises the confidentiality of sensitive information stored within SiYuan notebooks.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for organizations and individuals relying on SiYuan for secure note-taking and knowledge management. Confidential documents, such as personal records, proprietary business strategies, or private communications embedded in notes, can be exfiltrated by any internet user without authentication. This breach undermines the trust model of the application, particularly for users who utilize its sharing features to collaborate while expecting certain content blocks to remain strictly internal. The ability to retrieve full indexed text means that even if an asset is not directly linked or easily discoverable through normal browsing, it remains fully accessible via API manipulation, leading to potential data leaks and compliance violations depending on the nature of the stored information.

Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary and most effective mitigation is to upgrade SiYuan to version 3.8.10 or later, where this authorization logic has been corrected to ensure that asset retrieval respects the visibility settings defined in document rows. For environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should consider restricting network access to the API endpoints involved, particularly /api/asset/getDocAssets and /api/search/getAssetContentByPath, using firewall rules or reverse proxy configurations that require authentication for all requests regardless of the target resource's public status. Additionally, implementing strict input validation and ensuring that backend services consistently enforce authorization checks based on user session context rather than just the existence of a reference can help prevent similar bypasses in future updates.

From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 regarding Improper Access Control, as well as CWE-601 which describes URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (though here it is more about unauthorized data access via valid URLs). In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object and potentially T1078 Valid Accounts if the attacker were to leverage stolen credentials, but in its current form as an anonymous exploit, it reflects a failure in proper access control enforcement that allows unauthorized data exfiltration. Security teams should treat such API-level authorization flaws with high priority, as they often represent blind spots where traditional perimeter defenses may not detect malicious activity due to the use of legitimate-looking endpoints and parameters.

Responsible

VulnCheck

Reservation

11/21/2026

Disclosure

11/21/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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