CVE-2026-67429 in flyto-core
Summary
by MITRE • 07/29/2026
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, image.download and related file-writing modules use caller-controlled output_dir instead of validate_path_with_env_config and its FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement, allowing attacker-controlled response bytes to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths the process can access. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/29/2026
The Flyto2 Core execution kernel represents a critical automation and AI-agent workflow platform that processes various file operations through its image.download and related file-writing modules. This vulnerability stems from a fundamental design flaw in how the system handles directory path validation during file operations, creating a path traversal risk that could allow unauthorized filesystem access. The issue specifically affects versions prior to 2.26.6 where the software fails to enforce proper sandboxing mechanisms during file write operations.
The technical flaw manifests when the image.download functionality accepts caller-controlled output_dir parameters without proper validation against the FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR environment configuration. This design choice bypasses the intended security boundaries that should contain all file operations within a designated sandbox directory structure. The vulnerability creates a direct path traversal condition where attacker-controlled response bytes can be written to arbitrary filesystem locations accessible by the process, effectively allowing remote code execution or data exfiltration scenarios. This flaw directly maps to CWE-22 Path Traversal and CWE-73 Path Traversal through Environment Variable Manipulation, with potential implications for privilege escalation and lateral movement.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple file writing capabilities, as it fundamentally undermines the security model of the execution kernel. Attackers could leverage this weakness to write malicious payloads to system directories, modify critical configuration files, or establish persistence mechanisms within the automation environment. The vulnerability particularly affects environments where Flyto2 Core operates with elevated privileges or has access to sensitive system resources. From an adversarial perspective, this issue aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter and T1078 Valid Accounts, as it could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code through modified file operations or escalate privileges by writing to system directories.
The fix implemented in version 2.26.6 addresses the core validation issue by enforcing proper path validation through validate_path_with_env_config and ensuring all file write operations respect the FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement. This remediation ensures that file operations are properly sandboxed and prevents attacker-controlled paths from bypassing security boundaries. Organizations using affected versions should prioritize immediate upgrades to 2.26.6 or later releases while implementing additional monitoring for suspicious file creation patterns in system directories. Security teams should also review environment configurations to ensure proper sandboxing enforcement and consider implementing additional controls such as mandatory access controls or file integrity monitoring to detect potential exploitation attempts.