CVE-2026-70052 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE • 10/14/2026
Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows PowerShell allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/14/2026
The vulnerability described involves a critical integer overflow or wraparound flaw within the Microsoft Windows PowerShell engine, which serves as both a command-line shell and a scripting language environment for system administration tasks on Windows operating systems. This specific type of memory corruption error occurs when an arithmetic operation produces a result that exceeds the maximum value representable by the allocated data type, causing the value to wrap around to a small positive number or zero rather than triggering an appropriate exception or error handling routine. In the context of PowerShell, such miscalculations often manifest during buffer allocation routines where memory size is determined based on user-supplied input or internal script variables. If the calculated size wraps around to a significantly smaller value than intended, the system allocates insufficient heap space for subsequent data operations.
When an attacker crafts malicious input that triggers this integer overflow condition within PowerShell scripts or cmdlets, they can induce a buffer over-read or write operation beyond the boundaries of the allocated memory block. This boundary violation allows for arbitrary code execution in the context of the currently logged-in user. Since PowerShell is frequently used by system administrators and often runs with elevated privileges to manage servers and workstations, successful exploitation could grant an attacker significant control over the affected system. The vulnerability does not require remote interaction or network exposure; it relies on local access, meaning a low-privileged user who can execute scripts within their session may leverage this flaw to escalate privileges or inject malicious code into legitimate processes running under higher privilege levels.
From a technical standpoint, this issue aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers such as CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound and potentially CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write if the overflow leads to memory corruption that overwrites adjacent heap metadata or function pointers. The exploitation vector is classified under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, where attackers utilize trusted applications like PowerShell to execute malicious payloads without triggering typical security alerts due to the application's legitimate status and high trust level within Windows environments. This makes detection challenging as standard endpoint protection solutions may not flag normal PowerShell activity that has been subtly manipulated through memory corruption techniques.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in enterprise environments where PowerShell automation scripts are prevalent. An attacker with local access can bypass security controls by leveraging the trusted nature of PowerShell to download and execute additional malware, establish persistence mechanisms, or move laterally across a network if they gain sufficient privileges. The ability to execute code locally means that physical access or initial foothold via phishing emails leading to script execution is all that is required for exploitation. This underscores the risk associated with default configurations that allow unrestricted PowerShell usage without proper logging and constraint-based policies in place.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both patching and configuration hardening. Organizations should immediately apply the latest security updates provided by Microsoft, which address the underlying memory management logic to prevent integer wraparound scenarios from resulting in exploitable conditions. Beyond patching, implementing Windows PowerShell Constrained Language Mode is critical for restricting the scope of operations that scripts can perform, thereby limiting an attacker's ability to interact with sensitive APIs or system components even if code execution occurs. Additionally, enabling Script Block Logging and Module Loading Logging provides visibility into script activities, allowing security teams to detect anomalous behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Restricting PowerShell execution policies to AllSigned ensures that only scripts signed by trusted publishers can run, adding a layer of integrity verification that complicates the deployment of malicious payloads relying on this vulnerability.