CVE-2026-55498 in FileRise
Summary
by MITRE • 10/15/2026
FileRise is a self-hosted web-based file manager with multi-file upload, editing, and batch operations. Prior to 3.15.0, FileRise public shared-folder links with subfolder browsing enabled can follow a symbolic link inside the shared folder to a sibling directory under the upload root. An unauthenticated holder of a valid share token can use shared-folder listing, direct download, or ZIP creation to access files outside the folder that was actually shared. The flaw occurs because the affected shared-folder paths resolve symlinks without enforcing the original shared folder as the real-path boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/15/2026
FileRise is a self-hosted web-based file management solution designed to facilitate multi-file uploads, editing capabilities, and batch operations for users managing digital assets. The software provides functionality for creating public shared folders with specific access controls, including the ability to enable subfolder browsing within those shares. This feature set allows administrators or content creators to expose curated directories to external parties without granting full system access. However, prior to version 3.15.0, a critical architectural flaw existed in how these shared folder paths were resolved and validated against security boundaries. The vulnerability stems from the application's handling of symbolic links within the context of public sharing mechanisms. When a user creates a share that includes subfolder browsing capabilities, the backend logic is responsible for traversing directory structures to list contents or prepare files for download. In this specific version, the path resolution mechanism fails to enforce strict containment boundaries relative to the originally shared folder root.
The core technical flaw involves insufficient validation of symbolic links during file system traversal operations. Specifically, when a public share token is presented by an unauthenticated user, FileRise resolves paths associated with that share without ensuring that any intermediate symbolic links remain within the designated safe directory boundary. If a symlink inside the shared folder points to a sibling directory located under the broader upload root but outside the specific subfolder intended for sharing, the application incorrectly treats this external path as valid content belonging to the share. This behavior violates the fundamental security principle of least privilege and isolation, effectively allowing an attacker to bypass access controls by leveraging standard operating system features like symbolic links to escape the sandboxed environment of the shared directory.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for organizations relying on FileRise for secure file distribution. An unauthenticated actor possessing a valid share token can exploit this path traversal weakness through several vectors provided by the application interface. By utilizing the shared-folder listing feature, an attacker may discover files located in sibling directories that were not intended to be part of the public share. Furthermore, direct download functions and ZIP creation mechanisms also suffer from this flaw, allowing the exfiltration of sensitive data residing outside the authorized scope. This constitutes a clear case of directory traversal leading to unauthorized information disclosure, where the confidentiality integrity is compromised because users cannot trust that files within a shared folder are strictly confined to that folder's logical boundaries.
From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as directory traversal. The attack vector leverages symbolic link following without proper boundary enforcement, which is often categorized under path canonicalization issues where the application fails to resolve and validate the real path before processing requests. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior facilitates unauthorized access to files that are not explicitly shared, potentially falling under techniques related to Collection or Exfiltration depending on the sensitivity of the accessed data. The lack of strict containment allows an unauthenticated user to escalate their effective privileges from a limited viewer of one folder to a reader of broader system directories, undermining the trust model of the file sharing service.
To mitigate this vulnerability and prevent similar issues in future deployments, it is imperative that organizations upgrade FileRise to version 3.15.0 or later immediately upon availability. The developers have addressed this flaw by implementing stricter path validation logic that ensures symbolic links are resolved and verified against the original shared folder's real-path boundary before any file operations are permitted. For environments where upgrading may not be instantly feasible, administrators should consider disabling subfolder browsing for public shares if possible, as this reduces the attack surface related to directory traversal. Additionally, reviewing server-side configurations to restrict symlink creation or following within web-accessible directories can provide an additional layer of defense in depth. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on path manipulation techniques are recommended to ensure that file management applications maintain strict isolation between shared resources and internal system files.