CVE-2026-76054 in blackduck-c-cpp
Summary
by MITRE • 08/24/2026
Invocation of Process Using Visible Sensitive Information in Black Duck blackduck-c-cpp 1.0.17 through 3.0.6 allows an actor able to execute code within the scanned project's build to obtain the Black Duck API token via the ambient process environment, which is inherited by subprocesses launched during build capture and signature scanning. This applies only where the token is supplied through the BLACKDUCK_API_TOKEN or BD_HUB_TOKEN environment variable.
Upgrading does not remediate prior disclosure; any token supplied to an affected version through an environment variable should be rotated.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2026
The vulnerability identified in Black Duck blackduck-c-cpp versions 1.0.17 through 3.0.6 represents a critical flaw in how sensitive authentication credentials are handled during the software composition analysis process. This issue is classified under CWE-200, which covers Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, and aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1552.004, specifically Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys. The core technical flaw lies in the invocation of processes that rely on visible sensitive information within the operating system's environment variables. When a user supplies their Black Duck API token via either the BLACKDUCK_API_TOKEN or BD_HUB_TOKEN environment variable, this credential becomes part of the ambient process environment. In Unix-like systems and many Windows configurations, environment variables are inherited by child processes spawned by a parent process. Consequently, any subprocess launched during build capture or signature scanning inherits these variables, making the API token accessible to all subsequent commands executed within that context.
An actor with the ability to execute code within the scanned project's build environment can exploit this inheritance mechanism to extract the Black Duck API token from the ambient process space. This access does not require elevated privileges beyond what is necessary to run the build or scan tasks, making it a relatively low-barrier attack vector for anyone who has write access to the source code and build scripts of the targeted project. Once obtained, the compromised API token grants the attacker full administrative control over the associated Black Duck Hub account. This level of access allows the adversary to view all software bills of materials (SBOMs), modify vulnerability data, inject malicious components into dependency trees, or exfiltrate proprietary intellectual property stored within the platform. The impact is severe because it undermines the integrity and confidentiality of the entire supply chain security posture managed by Black Duck for that organization.
The operational implications extend beyond immediate credential theft. If an attacker gains access to the API token, they can manipulate vulnerability data to hide known vulnerabilities in specific components, thereby creating a false sense of security during development cycles. They may also introduce new dependencies containing malicious code or backdoors into the project's dependency graph. Furthermore, the persistence of this risk is significant because upgrading the Black Duck software does not remediate tokens that were already disclosed through environment variables in previous versions. The vulnerability persists as long as the compromised token remains valid and active within the system. This means that even after patching the underlying application to prevent future exposures, existing leaked credentials remain a viable attack vector for unauthorized access.
To mitigate this risk, immediate action is required regarding credential management rather than relying solely on software updates. Any API tokens supplied through environment variables in affected versions must be rotated immediately by generating new keys within the Black Duck Hub interface and revoking the old ones. This step effectively invalidates any stolen credentials obtained via the process inheritance flaw. Going forward, organizations should adopt secure practices for handling sensitive data during build processes. Instead of using ambient environment variables, which are visible to all subprocesses and potentially logged in build output or debug traces, developers should use more isolated methods such as secret management services like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Kubernetes secrets that do not leak into the standard process environment. Additionally, restricting permissions on build environments so that only authorized service accounts can access sensitive tokens will further reduce the attack surface for this type of credential harvesting.