CVE-2026-78180 in nextinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 08/24/2026

A security flaw has been discovered in alibaba-fusion next up to 1.27.34. This issue affects the function ConfigProvider.getContextProps of the file components/dialog/index.tsx of the component deepMerge. Performing a manipulation of the argument locale results in improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack may be initiated remotely. The reported GitHub issue was closed automatically due to inactivity.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2026

The vulnerability identified within Alibaba Fusion Next, specifically affecting versions up through 1.27.34, represents a significant risk related to insecure deserialization and prototype pollution. This flaw resides within the deepMerge utility function located in the components/dialog/index.tsx file, which is invoked by the ConfigProvider.getContextProps method. The core technical issue stems from how this merge operation handles object properties without sufficient validation of property names or structural integrity. When an attacker provides a manipulated argument for the locale parameter, they can inject malicious keys that target internal prototype attributes rather than standard data fields. This behavior allows for improper control over modification of object prototype attributes, effectively altering the base structure shared by all instances of certain objects within the application runtime environment.

This type of vulnerability is classically categorized under CWE-1325, which describes improperly controlled sequential construction patterns that lead to prototype pollution, and often overlaps with CWE-915 regarding Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker can modify the properties of built-in JavaScript objects such as Array or Object prototypes. This manipulation persists across all subsequent instantiations of those object types within the same execution context. The impact is severe because it allows for state tampering that can bypass security checks, alter application logic flow, or lead to denial of service conditions by corrupting essential data structures used throughout the framework.

The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data corruption. Since ConfigProvider is often a high-level component in React-based applications using Alibaba Fusion Next, it influences how configuration and context are propagated down the component tree. An attacker who can trigger this function with crafted input can effectively hijack the application's behavior by injecting properties that interfere with authentication mechanisms, session management, or other critical business logic dependent on object integrity. For instance, modifying prototype methods could allow for arbitrary code execution if those modified prototypes are later invoked in a context where user-controlled data is processed without sanitization. This transforms what might seem like a configuration issue into a potential remote code execution vector depending on the specific usage patterns of the application.

The attack surface for this vulnerability includes any endpoint or interface that accepts locale configurations and passes them through the ConfigProvider.getContextProps function before rendering dialog components. Because the GitHub issue associated with this flaw was closed automatically due to inactivity, it highlights a gap in the maintenance lifecycle where critical security patches may not be promptly applied by downstream consumers of the library. Remote initiation is possible if these configuration parameters are exposed via web APIs or user-facing forms that allow arbitrary string input without strict schema validation. This makes the vulnerability particularly dangerous in public-facing applications where attackers can probe for misconfigurations remotely.

Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most effective solution is to upgrade Alibaba Fusion Next to a version greater than 1.27.34, assuming that subsequent releases have implemented proper prototype pollution defenses such as using Object.create(null) for merge targets or employing libraries like lodash.merge which handle deep merging safely by avoiding prototype inheritance issues. For applications unable to immediately upgrade, developers should implement strict input validation on the locale parameter and any other configuration objects passed to ConfigProvider. This includes ensuring that only whitelisted property names are accepted and rejecting inputs containing suspicious keys such as _proto_, constructor, or prototype. Additionally, integrating static analysis tools into the CI/CD pipeline can help detect instances of unsafe deep merging practices before they reach production environments.

From a defensive posture perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1505.003, which covers Server Side Request Forgery via Component Injection, although in this specific case it is more accurately mapped to data manipulation techniques that facilitate further exploitation. Security teams should monitor for unusual patterns in object property access and consider implementing Content Security Policy headers to limit the impact of any potential script injection resulting from prototype pollution. Regular audits of third-party dependencies are crucial, as libraries like Alibaba Fusion Next form the backbone of many enterprise applications, making their security posture directly proportional to the overall resilience of the hosted services. Ensuring that all configuration inputs are sanitized and validated against a strict schema is the primary defense against this class of vulnerability.

Responsible

VulDB

Disclosure

08/24/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

low

Sources

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