CVE-2026-78251 in Air 3
Summary
by MITRE • 08/24/2026
DJI drones contain an FTP service that uses hardcoded credentials shared across affected models and permits authenticated users to upload files without limits on file size, file count, or total storage consumed in **/blackbox/upgrade/**, as well as overwrite existing files in that directory. An attacker with access to the drone's internal network or USB RNDIS interface can exhaust the available storage, preventing the aircraft from writing flight records, logs, and telemetry and potentially preventing subsequent firmware updates. Uploaded files persist across reboot and factory reset.
Affected models are DJI Neo until 01.00.0400, DJI Neo 2 until 01.00.0500, DJI Flip until 01.00.1200, DJI Air 3 until 01.00.1600, DJI Air 3S until 01.00.1400, DJI Avata 2 until 01.00.0400, DJI Avata 360 until 01.00.0300, DJI Mavic 3 until 01.00.1400, DJI Mavic 3 Classic until 01.00.0800, DJI Mavic 3 Pro until 01.01.0700, DJI Mavic 4 Pro until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 2 until 01.07.0200, DJI Mini 3 until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 3 Pro until 01.00.0900, DJI Mini 4 Pro until 01.00.1100, and DJI Mini 5 Pro until 01.00.0600.
Remediation requires a firmware update from the vendor.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2026
The identified vulnerability represents a critical failure in access control and resource management within the embedded software of various DJI drone models, specifically affecting devices running firmware versions prior to those listed for each model line including the Neo, Air series, Avata series, Mavic series, and Mini series. The core technical flaw resides in an FTP service that operates with hardcoded credentials shared across multiple affected hardware variants, creating a single point of failure where compromise of one device potentially compromises others using identical authentication tokens. This design choice violates fundamental security principles regarding unique credential generation per instance or session, thereby facilitating unauthorized access by any actor who can obtain these static keys through reverse engineering, network sniffing during initial setup, or other means of credential leakage.
The operational impact is severe due to the lack of input validation and resource limits on file uploads within the /blackbox/upgrade/ directory. An attacker with physical proximity allowing connection via USB RNDIS interface or access to the drone's internal Wi-Fi network can authenticate using these hardcoded credentials and subsequently upload arbitrary files without restrictions on size, count, or total storage consumption. This unrestricted write capability allows for a straightforward denial of service attack by filling the device's non-volatile memory until it is completely exhausted. Since this directory stores critical flight records, black box logs, telemetry data, and firmware update packages, saturating the storage prevents the aircraft from writing new operational data during flights.
The persistence of uploaded files across reboots and factory resets exacerbates the severity of this vulnerability by ensuring that standard remediation attempts such as resetting the device to factory defaults do not remove malicious payloads or clear the filled storage space. This characteristic implies that the flaw is embedded in the persistent file system structure rather than temporary volatile memory, requiring a deliberate firmware update from the vendor to properly address the underlying code issues and restore normal functionality. The inability to write flight logs also poses significant safety risks as it hinders post-flight analysis and troubleshooting while potentially preventing subsequent firmware updates which are essential for maintaining device security and performance over time.
From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, reflecting the insecure practice of embedding static authentication tokens within the application binary that cannot be changed by end-users or administrators without a full software replacement. Additionally, it aligns with CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption and CWE-269: Improper Privilege Control, as the service allows authenticated users to perform actions beyond their intended scope of resource usage without adequate throttling mechanisms. In terms of adversarial tactics, this scenario corresponds to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1530: Data from Cloud or Storage Object, where an attacker accesses and potentially exfiltrates data stored in cloud-like environments, although here the storage is local but accessed via network protocols similar to FTP services often targeted for unauthorized file manipulation.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate firmware updates provided by DJI to patch these specific flaws in access control logic and resource management constraints. Until such patches are applied or deployed across affected fleets, operators should restrict physical access to drones during maintenance phases and avoid connecting them to untrusted networks that might expose the RNDIS interface to malicious actors capable of exploiting the FTP service. Network segmentation policies within drone operation environments can also help isolate these devices from broader corporate or home networks where credential theft is more prevalent, thereby reducing the attack surface available for exploitation of this hardcoded authentication weakness and subsequent storage exhaustion attacks.