CVE-2026-9191 in MarkLogic Server
Summary
by MITRE • 10/12/2026
Progress MarkLogic Server 12.x releases before 12.1.0 and 11.x releases before 11.3.7 do not sufficiently isolate user-supplied code executed through certain REST and XDBC evaluation paths from HTTP request, response, and session state. An attacker able to execute code through an affected path could perform unauthorized actions or compromise an authenticated session.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/12/2026
The vulnerability identified in Progress MarkLogic Server versions 12.x prior to 12.1.0 and 11.x prior to 11.3.7 represents a critical failure in the isolation of execution contexts within the application server architecture. This flaw specifically affects the REST API endpoints and XDBC evaluation paths, which are primary interfaces for interacting with the database content and logic. The core technical deficiency lies in how user-supplied code is processed when invoked through these specific channels. Instead of executing such code within a strictly sandboxed environment that separates it from sensitive server state, the system allows this external input to interact directly with HTTP request objects, response streams, and active session data. This lack of proper boundary enforcement means that arbitrary code executed by an attacker gains unintended access privileges beyond what is typically granted for standard query operations or content retrieval tasks.
From a technical perspective, this issue aligns closely with CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) combined with aspects of CWE-285 Improper Authorization and CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration. When an attacker successfully injects malicious code into these evaluation paths, the server does not adequately restrict the scope of that execution. Consequently, the injected script can read or modify HTTP request parameters, alter response headers, and manipulate session cookies or tokens associated with authenticated users. This capability effectively bypasses standard access controls because the elevated privileges granted to the execution context allow it to act as if it were part of the server's internal logic rather than an external user input. The separation between untrusted user data and trusted system state is fundamentally broken, creating a pathway for privilege escalation within the application layer.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in environments where MarkLogic Server handles sensitive business data or serves as a backend for critical web applications. An attacker who can exploit this flaw to execute code through these paths could perform unauthorized actions that compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the system. Most notably, the ability to manipulate session state allows an attacker to hijack authenticated sessions. By stealing or modifying session identifiers, an adversary can impersonate legitimate users without needing their credentials. This leads directly to account takeover scenarios where sensitive data is exfiltrated, modified, or deleted based on the privileges of the compromised user account. Furthermore, access to HTTP request and response objects enables potential manipulation of application logic flow, leading to further exploitation chains such as server-side request forgery or injection attacks against downstream services that trust the MarkLogic Server's output.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching to eliminate the root cause of this isolation failure. Administrators should upgrade Progress MarkLogic Server to version 12.1.0 or later for the 12.x branch, and version 11.3.7 or later for the 11.x branch, as these releases contain the necessary fixes to enforce proper context separation. In scenarios where immediate patching is not feasible due to operational constraints, temporary mitigations should focus on restricting access to the affected REST endpoints and XDBC interfaces. This can be achieved by implementing strict network-level controls such as firewall rules or reverse proxy configurations that limit exposure only to trusted IP addresses. Additionally, enabling robust input validation and sanitization for any user-supplied content passed through these evaluation paths may reduce the attack surface, although it does not fully resolve the underlying architectural flaw regarding session isolation. Regular security audits of API usage patterns can also help in detecting anomalous behavior indicative of exploitation attempts against this vulnerability.