CVE-2026-92756 in Entity Framework Core Provider
Summary
by MITRE • 09/17/2026
Applications built on MongoDB Entity Framework Core Provider which combine independent encryption settings and this provider's encryption settings may silently lose TLS and schema-map settings leading to protected fields being stored unencrypted in the database.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/17/2026
The vulnerability described involves a critical configuration conflict within applications utilizing the MongoDB Entity Framework Core Provider, specifically concerning data protection mechanisms. When developers configure independent encryption settings alongside those provided by the EF Core provider, a silent failure occurs where Transport Layer Security (TLS) and schema-map configurations are disregarded or overwritten. This misconfiguration results in sensitive fields that were intended to be encrypted at rest being stored in plaintext within the MongoDB database. The severity of this issue lies not only in the exposure of confidential data but also in its stealthy nature, as standard application logs may not explicitly flag the encryption failure, leading administrators and developers to believe their security controls are active when they are effectively bypassed.
From a technical perspective, this flaw stems from an improper handling of configuration precedence or state management within the ORM layer. The Entity Framework Core provider likely attempts to merge user-defined encryption parameters with its own internal defaults without validating that both sets of settings can coexist harmoniously. In many such implementations, if conflicting directives are detected, the system may default to a less secure mode or simply ignore the explicit TLS requirements in favor of local storage optimizations. This results in data being written directly to the database engine without applying the necessary cryptographic transformations defined by the schema map. The absence of an error message during this process is particularly dangerous, as it prevents immediate detection and allows the vulnerability to persist across deployments until a thorough audit or breach occurs.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, constituting a direct violation of data confidentiality requirements under regulations such as GDPR, HIPAA, and PCI-DSS. Since protected fields are stored unencrypted, any unauthorized access to the MongoDB instance—whether through SQL injection in an adjacent application layer, misconfigured cloud storage permissions, or compromised credentials—will result in immediate exposure of sensitive information. Attackers can extract personally identifiable information (PII), financial records, or proprietary data without needing to break encryption algorithms. Furthermore, because the loss of TLS settings may also imply that data is transmitted unencrypted if the provider relies on those same configurations for network security, the risk extends beyond storage at rest to include interception during transit, although the primary concern here remains the plaintext storage in the database.
This issue aligns with CWE-319, which classifies cleartext transmission of sensitive information, and more specifically relates to CWE-200, where exposure of sensitive information occurs due to improper configuration or handling. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability facilitates Data from Information Repositories (T1005) by making data easily accessible without decryption overhead for attackers who gain initial access. It also reflects weaknesses in Configuration Management (CWE-16), where security controls are not properly enforced due to conflicting or incorrect settings. The silent nature of the failure means that traditional monitoring tools might not trigger alerts, allowing adversaries to exfiltrate large volumes of data over extended periods without detection.
Mitigation strategies must focus on rigorous configuration validation and defensive coding practices within the application layer. Developers should avoid mixing independent encryption libraries with ORM-specific providers unless explicitly supported by both vendors in a documented manner. If such integration is necessary, comprehensive unit tests should be implemented to verify that encrypted fields are indeed stored as ciphertext after write operations. Additionally, implementing database-level auditing or using MongoDB's native field-level encryption features can provide an additional layer of security independent of the application framework. Regular security assessments and static code analysis tools configured to detect potential configuration conflicts in ORM setups are essential for identifying these issues before deployment. Organizations should also enforce strict separation of concerns by ensuring that only one authoritative source manages data protection settings, thereby eliminating ambiguity in how encryption is applied to database entities.