CVE-2026-93467 in OAKclouds-custom_page-2.0
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
The OAKlouds developed by HGiga has a Insecure Deserialization vulnerability. Unauthenticated remote attackers can execute arbitrary code on the server by sending maliciously crafted serialized content.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
HGiga's OAKcloud platform contains an insecure deserialization flaw that allows unauthenticated, remote adversaries to achieve arbitrary code execution on affected servers. This vulnerability stems from a fundamental failure in input validation and type safety during the processing of serialized data objects. When the application receives user-supplied content intended for reconstruction into native object structures, it fails to verify the integrity or origin of the payload prior to deserialization. Consequently, an attacker can craft maliciously formatted serialized streams that exploit unsafe reflection mechanisms within the underlying runtime environment. By injecting specially constructed payloads containing dangerous gadget chains, the adversary forces the application to instantiate classes with side effects during the reconstruction process, thereby bypassing authentication controls and gaining a foothold on the host system.
The technical mechanism behind this exploitation relies heavily on the behavior of modern serialization frameworks which often support polymorphic deserialization by default or through specific configuration flags. In such scenarios, the parser attempts to resolve class names dynamically based on data contained within the serialized stream rather than enforcing strict type constraints defined in the application logic. An attacker leverages known vulnerable libraries present in the server's dependency tree, constructing a chain of method calls that ultimately leads to command execution or remote code execution. This technique is particularly dangerous because it does not require any prior authentication credentials, making it accessible to any actor with network connectivity to the exposed service endpoints. The lack of input sanitization means that even seemingly innocuous data formats can be weaponized if they trigger these unsafe deserialization paths within the server-side processing pipeline.
From an operational perspective, the impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially catastrophic for organizational security postures. Successful exploitation grants attackers full control over the compromised server process, which typically runs with elevated privileges depending on how OAKcloud is deployed. This access allows adversaries to exfiltrate sensitive data stored within the application's database or file system, modify configuration settings to maintain persistence, or pivot further into internal network segments if the server has broader connectivity than intended. Furthermore, because the attack vector is remote and unauthenticated, it significantly increases the risk of automated scanning campaigns targeting exposed instances globally. The ability to execute arbitrary code effectively neutralizes traditional perimeter defenses such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems that rely on signature-based patterns rather than behavioral analysis or strict input validation protocols.
To mitigate this critical vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts should focus on upgrading OAKcloud to a patched version released by HGiga that addresses the deserialization logic flaws. In cases where patching is not immediately feasible, organizations must implement robust network-level controls such as web application firewalls configured to detect and block known malicious serialization patterns or unusual data sizes associated with gadget chain payloads. Additionally, restricting server-side access to only necessary ports and protocols reduces the attack surface available to remote attackers. Application developers should also enforce strict type checking during deserialization processes by whitelisting allowed classes rather than relying on dynamic resolution mechanisms. Implementing input validation that rejects unexpected object types or structures can prevent the instantiation of dangerous classes before they are processed, thereby neutralizing the exploit at the application layer without requiring deep packet inspection capabilities across all network boundaries.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data, which categorizes flaws where applications deserialize data from untrusted sources without proper validation or integrity checks. The exploitation technique described corresponds to MITRE ATT&CK tactic T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application and specifically the sub-technique for deserialization attacks often associated with remote code execution vectors like T1203 Execution via Remote Services when combined with lateral movement capabilities. Understanding these mappings helps security teams prioritize remediation efforts based on standardized risk frameworks while ensuring that defensive measures address both the immediate technical flaw and the broader operational risks posed by unauthenticated remote code execution scenarios in enterprise cloud platforms.