CVE-2026-93445 in Langflow OSS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/07/2026
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper control of generation of code.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/07/2026
The vulnerability identified in IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 represents a critical security flaw rooted in the application's handling of dynamic content generation and execution workflows. As an open-source framework designed for building large language model applications, Langflow facilitates the creation of complex chains where user inputs are processed by various nodes that may invoke external tools or execute code snippets. The core issue lies in how these generated components handle input validation and sanitization before execution. When a remote authenticated attacker interacts with the application interface, they can manipulate specific parameters within workflow definitions or node configurations to inject malicious payloads. Because the system trusts inputs from authenticated users to some extent without sufficiently rigorous verification of their safety, it becomes possible for an adversary to craft requests that result in arbitrary code execution on the host server running the Langflow instance.
This flaw is technically classified under CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection), as the vulnerability allows an attacker to control or inject executable code into a context where it will be interpreted and run by the application environment. The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, potentially leading to full system compromise. An authenticated user who exploits this flaw can execute commands with the privileges of the Langflow process, which often includes access to sensitive data stored within the LLM applications being built or managed through the platform. This could result in unauthorized access to proprietary information, modification or deletion of critical datasets, and further lateral movement into other parts of the internal network if the server is not properly isolated. The risk is exacerbated by the fact that Langflow is often deployed in development environments where security controls might be relaxed for ease of use, making it a prime target for exploitation during the application design phase.
From an offensive security perspective, this vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Command and Scripting Interpreter abuse, specifically T1059 which covers various scripting languages used by attackers to execute malicious commands on compromised systems. The attack vector typically involves authenticated users manipulating workflow JSON structures or API calls that trigger the execution of untrusted code blocks within the Langflow engine. Since authentication is required, this limits the scope to insider threats or accounts whose credentials have been compromised through phishing or other means. However, given the high privilege level often associated with development tools and server-side applications, even a single successful exploitation can lead to significant data breaches and operational disruption for organizations relying on IBM Langflow for their AI-driven projects.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary recommendation is to upgrade immediately to the latest version of IBM Langflow where this issue has been addressed by implementing stricter input validation, sandboxing mechanisms for code execution nodes, and enhanced separation of privileges between user-generated workflows and system-level operations. Organizations should also enforce least-privilege principles by ensuring that the Langflow service runs under a dedicated, restricted user account with minimal permissions to prevent arbitrary command execution from affecting the underlying operating system. Additionally, implementing network segmentation can limit the blast radius in case of exploitation, while monitoring for unusual process creation or outbound connections originating from the Langflow server can aid in early detection and response efforts. Regular security audits of workflow definitions and strict governance over who has administrative access to modify core application logic are also essential components of a robust defense-in-depth strategy against such injection-based vulnerabilities.