CVE-2026-93679 in Langflow OSS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/07/2026
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to uncontrolled resource consumption during ZIP file extraction.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/07/2026
The vulnerability identified in IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.12.2 represents a significant security risk related to the handling of compressed archive files, specifically within the context of remote authenticated access. As an open-source framework designed for building and deploying language model applications, Langflow often processes user-uploaded assets or configuration packages that may include ZIP archives. The core technical flaw lies in the application's resource management logic during the extraction phase of these ZIP files. When a malicious actor provides a specially crafted archive, the system fails to adequately constrain the resources consumed by the decompression process. This lack of control over resource consumption allows an attacker to trigger conditions that exhaust server memory or CPU cycles, leading directly to service degradation or complete unavailability for legitimate users.
From a technical perspective, this issue is characteristic of what is commonly known as a Zip Bomb attack or more broadly categorized under CWE-409, which refers to the extraction of excessively large files resulting in resource exhaustion. The vulnerability exploits the fundamental nature of compression algorithms where a small file can expand into gigabytes of data upon decompression if it contains highly repetitive patterns or nested archives with high entropy reduction ratios. In this specific implementation within Langflow, the application likely attempts to fully extract all contents into memory or disk without implementing strict limits on the total uncompressed size, the number of files extracted, or the depth of directory nesting. This oversight allows a remote authenticated attacker, who possesses valid credentials for the platform, to submit a maliciously constructed ZIP file that triggers this uncontrolled expansion. The authentication requirement indicates that while the attack vector is network-accessible, it requires an initial foothold within the application's user ecosystem, distinguishing it from fully open attacks but still posing a severe threat in multi-tenant or internal deployment scenarios where trust boundaries may be loosely defined among users.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is primarily centered on denial of service conditions. By consuming excessive system resources such as RAM and CPU time during the extraction process, an attacker can effectively crash the Langflow application instance or cause it to become unresponsive. In cloud-native environments typical for modern AI frameworks, this resource exhaustion could lead to pod restarts in Kubernetes clusters or trigger auto-scaling events that incur unnecessary costs while disrupting service continuity. Furthermore, if the underlying infrastructure shares resources with other critical services, the impact may extend beyond Langflow itself, potentially affecting adjacent applications running on the same host node. This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1496, which covers Resource Hijacking, specifically sub-technique T1496.002 for Denial of Service via resource exhaustion. The attacker leverages legitimate functionality to degrade system performance, making detection difficult as the activity appears similar to normal file processing operations until resource limits are breached.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural resilience. The most effective solution is to upgrade IBM Langflow to a version newer than 1.12.2 where this vulnerability has been patched by implementing proper input validation and size constraints during ZIP extraction. Developers should enforce strict limits on the maximum uncompressed file size, limit the number of files that can be extracted from a single archive, and restrict directory traversal depth to prevent nested bomb attacks. Additionally, running these operations in isolated environments with resource quotas such as cgroups or container memory limits can contain the blast radius even if an exploit is attempted. For organizations unable to immediately patch, implementing network-level controls like Web Application Firewalls (WAF) that inspect uploaded files for known malicious signatures or anomalous compression ratios may provide a layer of defense. It is also critical to review authentication mechanisms and ensure that only trusted users have the ability to upload complex file structures, thereby reducing the attack surface available to potential adversaries seeking to exploit this resource consumption flaw.