CVE-2026-94566 in NukeViet
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
NukeViet CMS is a multi Content Management System. In 4.6.00, an unauthenticated attacker can rotate X-Forwarded-For because vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Ips.php accepts forwarded client-IP headers without first confirming that REMOTE_ADDR is a trusted proxy. The resulting NV_CLIENT_IP keys the administrator login blocker in includes/core/admin_login.php; changing only the header value bypasses that lockout and permits effectively unlimited password guesses. The same spoofable address is also consumed by the user login blocker in modules/users/funcs/login.php, IP restrictions, bans, flood controls, and security logs, but those additional code-level effects were not dynamically demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.01.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in NukeViet CMS versions prior to 4.6.01 represents a critical failure in input validation regarding HTTP header integrity and trust boundaries. Specifically, the application logic within vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Ips.php is configured to accept the X-Forwarded-For header as the definitive source of truth for client IP addresses without performing any verification against the REMOTE_ADDR environment variable or a list of trusted proxies. In standard web architectures utilizing reverse proxies or load balancers, the X-Forwarded-For header is often used to preserve the original client IP address across multiple hops. However, this mechanism relies entirely on the assumption that intermediate network devices correctly populate this header and that the application can distinguish between headers set by trusted infrastructure versus those injected directly by end-users. By failing to validate whether the connection originates from a known proxy or direct client access, NukeViet CMS allows any unauthenticated attacker to arbitrarily manipulate their perceived IP address through simple HTTP request modification tools.
This architectural flaw has severe operational consequences primarily centered around authentication security controls. The application utilizes the NV_CLIENT_IP variable derived from this spoofed header to enforce administrator login lockout mechanisms located in includes/core/admin_login.php. Typically, such systems are designed to temporarily block an account after a specified number of failed password attempts to mitigate brute-force attacks. Because the attacker can rotate the X-Forwarded-For header with each request, they appear as distinct clients to the application's security logic. This effectively nullifies the lockout mechanism, allowing for unlimited password guessing attempts against administrative accounts without triggering any defensive countermeasures. The same vulnerability extends to user-level authentication flows in modules/users/funcs/login.php, where IP-based restrictions and flood controls are similarly bypassed by manipulating this header field.
The impact of this vulnerability is compounded by its effect on broader security observability and enforcement mechanisms beyond just login attempts. Security logs, ban lists, and other IP-dependent features rely on the accuracy of client identification to function correctly. An attacker can evade bans or obscure their trail in audit logs simply by changing the header value for each subsequent request. This not only facilitates unauthorized access but also degrades the effectiveness of intrusion detection systems that depend on accurate source attribution. The lack of dynamic demonstration for these secondary effects does not diminish their potential severity, as any system relying on IP-based state management is vulnerable to this form of identity spoofing when trust boundaries are misconfigured.
This issue aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) related context where the server trusts untrusted input for critical security decisions. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1621 Multi-Factor Bypass, as it undermines multi-layered defenses that include rate limiting based on IP reputation or history. To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must upgrade immediately to NukeViet CMS version 4.6.01 where the vendor has addressed these trust boundary issues. For environments unable to patch immediately, a temporary mitigation involves configuring web servers like Apache or NGINX to strip or validate X-Forwarded-For headers before they reach the application backend, ensuring that only trusted proxy IPs can modify client identification data. Additionally, implementing strict validation logic within the CMS codebase to verify REMOTE_ADDR against expected proxy ranges would restore the integrity of IP-based security controls.