CVE-2026-99331 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: cp2112: validate response report lengths

The HID core invokes raw_event callbacks before validating the report length. cp2112_raw_event() reads every field of a transfer status response without checking size. For a data response, it reads the length at offset two and copies that many bytes from offset three, again without ensuring that the input report contains them.

Require a complete transfer status structure. For data responses, first require the header and then ensure the clamped payload length fits in the received report before copying it.

Commit 47669bec44fe ("HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence") added the same kind of raw_event length validation to hid-asus.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

The vulnerability identified within the Linux kernel's Human Interface Device subsystem, specifically affecting the cp2112 driver, stems from a critical lack of input validation regarding report lengths during event processing. The HID core architecture invokes raw_event callbacks for incoming data before performing strict validations on the length of the received reports. In the context of the cp2112 driver, which manages USB-to-I2C bridge devices, this architectural behavior creates an opportunity for out-of-bounds memory access if a malicious or malformed device sends improperly sized HID reports. The function cp2112_raw_event is designed to parse transfer status responses and data payloads but fails to verify that the input buffer contains sufficient bytes before attempting to read fields or copy payload data.

Technically, the flaw manifests in two distinct ways depending on the type of response received from the device. For a standard transfer status response, the driver proceeds to read every field associated with the structure without first confirming that the incoming report is large enough to contain all required fields. This unchecked access can lead to reading memory beyond the allocated buffer boundaries. More critically for data responses, the code reads an integer value at offset two of the input report which indicates the payload length. It then attempts to copy that many bytes starting from offset three into a local buffer or structure. Because there is no prior validation ensuring that the total size of the received HID report exceeds the sum of the header and the claimed payload length, this operation can result in reading arbitrary amounts of memory outside the bounds of the input data packet. This behavior constitutes an out-of-bounds read vulnerability, which aligns with CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read) as it allows the system to access memory locations that are not intended for use by the application logic.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant from a security and stability perspective. An attacker who can interact with the HID subsystem or spoof a device connected via the cp2112 interface could craft maliciously sized reports to trigger these out-of-bounds reads. While an out-of-bounds read typically results in information disclosure rather than immediate code execution, it exposes sensitive kernel memory contents that may include pointers, cryptographic keys, or other confidential data residing adjacent to the buffer in memory. Furthermore, if the subsequent processing of this corrupted data leads to further logic errors or heap corruption during handling, the risk escalates to potential denial-of-service conditions through kernel panics or crashes. This vulnerability is exploitable by any user with access to USB devices that can be enumerated as HID-compliant peripherals using the cp2112 driver, making it a relevant threat in environments where physical device insertion is possible.

The mitigation implemented addresses this flaw by enforcing strict structural integrity checks before data processing occurs. The updated code now requires a complete and valid transfer status structure for status responses, ensuring that all expected fields are present within the bounds of the received report. For data responses, the logic has been refined to first validate the presence of the necessary header bytes and then calculate whether the clamped payload length fits entirely within the remaining space of the input report. Only if this validation passes does the driver proceed to copy the payload data. This approach ensures that memory access operations remain strictly within allocated boundaries. The fix mirrors similar defensive coding practices recently applied to the hid-asus driver, reflecting a broader effort across the HID subsystem to harden raw_event handling against malformed inputs and align with secure development standards such as those outlined in MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) where input validation is key to preventing exploitation of system interfaces.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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