CVE-2026-99585 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Use kvm_s2_fault_vma_info in gmem_abort()
gmem_abort() maps at s2fd->fault_ipa, which HPFAR_EL2 holds at 4K granularity whatever the page size. The generic page-table code aligns it, but pkvm_pgtable_stage2_map() looks up existing mappings over [addr, addr + size), so on a pKVM host with pages larger than 4K a
guest_memfd-backed guest that faults past the first 4K of a page can find its neighbour's mapping, get -EAGAIN and take the same fault forever.
The memory fault exit reports s2fd->fault_ipa too, which for a nested guest's fault is the nested IPA rather than the canonical one kvm_gmem_get_pfn() failed on.
Take the addresses from kvm_s2_fault_vma_info instead, as user_mem_abort() does, and report the canonical gfn in the memory fault exit. kvm_s2_fault_get_vma_info() itself isn't called: a guest_memfd memslot's userspace_addr doesn't need to be backed by a VMA.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The Linux kernel vulnerability involving KVM on ARM64 architectures presents a critical flaw in the handling of stage-2 memory faults, specifically within the gmem_abort function used for managing guest_memfd-backed virtual machines. This issue arises from an inconsistency between how physical addresses are reported during fault conditions and how they are processed by the underlying page table management subsystems. The core technical deficiency lies in the fact that gmem_abort relies on s2fd->fault_ipa, a value stored in HPFAR_EL2 which is constrained to 4K granularity regardless of the actual page size configured for the guest memory region. While generic page-table code attempts to align this address, the subsequent call to pkvm_pgtable_stage2_map() performs lookups over the range from addr to addr plus size without sufficient alignment checks relative to larger page boundaries.
This architectural mismatch creates a severe operational risk in environments utilizing private kernel virtual machine (pKVM) hosts with memory pages larger than 4KB, such as 16KB or 64KB configurations common in modern ARM systems. When a guest_memfd-backed guest experiences a fault that occurs past the initial 4KB boundary of its allocated page, it may inadvertently access mappings belonging to neighboring virtual machines due to the lack of proper isolation at this granularity level. The consequence is an infinite loop where the guest repeatedly encounters -EAGAIN errors because the system fails to correctly identify and map the specific memory region involved in the fault. This results in a denial of service condition for the affected virtual machine, effectively freezing its execution until external intervention or host-level restart occurs.
Furthermore, the vulnerability extends beyond simple mapping failures into the realm of information leakage and incorrect state reporting. The memory fault exit mechanism currently reports s2fd->fault_ipa directly to userspace tools like QEMU. For nested guests, this value represents the nested Intermediate Physical Address rather than the canonical Guest Frame Number that kvm_gmem_get_pfn() originally failed on. This discrepancy prevents accurate debugging and error recovery by management software, as it receives an address that does not correspond to the actual memory location requiring remediation. The lack of alignment between the reported fault address and the actual mapped resource complicates troubleshooting efforts and can lead to incorrect assumptions about system state during incident response activities.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must ensure that addresses used for stage-2 mapping and fault reporting are derived from kvm_s2_fault_vma_info rather than relying solely on HPFAR_EL2 values which lack necessary granularity awareness. This approach mirrors the logic implemented in user_mem_abort(), ensuring consistent handling of memory faults across different subsystems within the KVM framework. By taking addresses directly from this structure, the system can correctly identify canonical guest frame numbers and apply appropriate page table mappings that respect the actual page size configuration. Although kvm_s2_fault_get_vma_info itself is not invoked due to the fact that guest_memfd memslots do not require backing by a Virtual Memory Area, extracting relevant address information through analogous means resolves the alignment discrepancy.
This flaw aligns with CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound in contexts where arithmetic operations on addresses fail to account for boundary conditions, as well as CWE-284 Improper Access Control regarding the potential cross-guest memory access resulting from incorrect mapping lookups. From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability relates to Tactic TA0005 Defense Evasion and TA0007 Discovery if exploited for lateral movement or information gathering within a compromised host environment, though its primary impact is availability disruption through resource exhaustion via infinite fault loops. Security practitioners should prioritize patching affected kernel versions and verify that guest memory configurations adhere to supported page size constraints until the fix is deployed across all nodes in virtualized infrastructure clusters.