CVE-2026-99674 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices
Sending a PF_PACKET bypasses the CAN framework logic and can directly reach a CAN driver's xmit() function. The PF_PACKET framework only checks that skb->len does not exceed the net_device MTU.
For a CAN device that is not CAN XL capable, anything above CANFD_MTU (72 bytes) is therefore dropped before it reaches the driver. However, CAN XL frames are variable length. can_is_canxl_skb() accepts lengths in the range CANXL_HDR_SIZE + CANXL_MIN_DLEN up to CANXL_MTU, i.e. 13 to 2060 bytes.
As a result, an ETH_P_CANXL skb with a length between 13 and 72 bytes can pass both the MTU and the can_dropped_invalid_skb() checks.
A driver that does not support CAN XL will interpret canxl_frame->flags as a length because of the overlap with can_frame->len. And because CANXL_XLF is set, the resulting length is between 128 and 255. For drivers that do not check can_frame->len before copying can_frame->data, as most drivers do, this results in a buffer overflow of up to 247 bytes.
Drop ETH_P_CANXL skbs if the device does not have the CAN_CAP_XL capability. Keep can_is_canxl_skb() for the validation of CAN XL skbs.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The Linux kernel contains a critical vulnerability within its Controller Area Network (CAN) subsystem that allows for buffer overflows when handling improperly validated network packets on devices lacking specific hardware capabilities. This flaw stems from an inconsistency in how packet filtering is applied to different types of CAN frames, specifically regarding the introduction and support of CAN XL frame formats. The underlying issue arises because the PF_PACKET socket interface bypasses much of the standard CAN framework logic, allowing data to reach a network device driver's transmission function directly. While this design offers flexibility for user-space applications, it relies heavily on lower-level checks that were not fully updated to account for the variable length characteristics and structural differences introduced by newer CAN standards.
The technical root cause lies in the interaction between Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) enforcement and specific frame validation logic. For standard CAN or CAN Flexible Data-Rate devices, packets exceeding 72 bytes are dropped before reaching the driver because they violate the MTU limits defined for those protocols. However, CAN XL frames utilize a variable length structure with headers that overlap in memory layout with older can_frame structures but differ significantly in interpretation. The function can_is_canxl_skb() is designed to validate these newer frames by accepting lengths ranging from 13 to 2060 bytes. When an ETH_P_CANXL packet arrives on a device that does not support CAN XL, the initial MTU check passes if the payload size falls between 13 and 72 bytes. Consequently, the invalid frame is passed down to the driver without being rejected by the higher-level framework checks intended for non-XL devices.
Once inside the driver, the vulnerability manifests as a severe buffer overflow due to misinterpretation of memory structures. Drivers that do not explicitly check for CAN XL capability often assume incoming data conforms to the legacy can_frame format. In this older structure, certain bytes in the header are interpreted as length indicators. Because the CAN XL frame flags include bits that overlap with these fields, a driver interpreting an ETH_P_CANXL packet will read incorrect values from the flag field. Specifically, if the CANXL_XL bit is set, the resulting interpreted length can range between 128 and 255 bytes. If the driver proceeds to copy data based on this inflated length value without verifying the actual buffer size or frame type, it writes beyond the allocated memory boundaries. This results in a heap-based buffer overflow of up to 247 bytes, which can lead to arbitrary code execution, kernel panic, or privilege escalation depending on the specific driver implementation and memory layout conditions at runtime.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input in C/C++, as the core failure is an unchecked copy operation driven by malformed input data. It also relates to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation, since the system failed to correctly validate that the incoming packet type was supported by the target hardware interface. In terms of offensive security frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, this flaw facilitates techniques associated with T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter or T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation if an attacker can inject crafted packets into a network segment monitored by vulnerable CAN interfaces. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in automotive or industrial control environments where CAN buses are increasingly connected to broader networks, allowing remote attackers to exploit the interface via PF_PACKET sockets.
To mitigate this risk, it is imperative that kernel developers and maintainers enforce strict capability checks before processing incoming frames at the driver level. The primary fix involves dropping ETH_P_CANXL packets immediately if the network device does not possess the CAN_CAP_XL capability flag set during initialization. This ensures that only devices explicitly designed to handle the larger, variable-length structures of CAN XL traffic are permitted to process them. Additionally, maintaining and enforcing the can_is_canxl_skb() validation logic is essential for ensuring that frame headers are correctly identified before any memory operations occur. System administrators should ensure their Linux kernels are updated with patches addressing this specific issue in the net/can/dev subsystem. Furthermore, drivers implementing CAN interfaces should be audited to verify they perform explicit capability checks and do not rely solely on MTU limits or implicit assumptions about packet structure when handling raw socket data.