CVE-2026-99800 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: free the task context after a grace period
A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work() running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else branch:
percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1); if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel))) wake_up(&tctx->wait); put_task_struct(tctx->task);
The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(), and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed along with the task_struct. It used to work out because io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.
Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in io_put_task() before the count is dropped.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026
The vulnerability identified within the Linux kernel's io_uring subsystem represents a critical race condition involving task context management, specifically affecting how memory associated with a task context structure is freed relative to concurrent access by non-owner threads. The core of this issue lies in the interaction between request completion handling and process termination or execution replacement scenarios. Under normal operation, when an io_uring ring exits work runs locally for deferred tasks or when completions are reaped via polling mechanisms like io_do_iopoll(), a task other than the original owner may invoke functions that ultimately lead to freeing resources associated with the context. The specific function involved is io_put_task(), which manages the reference counting and lifecycle of the task context structure, known as tctx.
In the flawed implementation, when io_put_task() executes under conditions where cancellation flags are set or during general cleanup paths not directly controlled by the ring owner, it proceeds to decrement a per-CPU counter tracking inflight requests using percpu_counter_sub(). This action is significant because it signals to other parts of the subsystem that an operation has completed. Immediately following this counter update, if certain atomic conditions regarding cancellation are met, the code may wake up waiting threads and subsequently call put_task_struct() on the underlying task structure. The critical flaw arises from the fact that while the task reference ensures the survival of the actual process data structure during these operations, it does not adequately protect the tctx memory allocation itself when freed in conjunction with the task struct under specific race conditions.
The root cause is traced back to a change in locking granularity within the io_uring codebase. Previously, functions such as io_uring_del_tctx_node() acquired the uring_lock while holding references during the cleanup phase of io_put_task(). This lock provided necessary serialization that prevented premature freeing of the tctx structure before all concurrent accesses had safely concluded. However, when this locking mechanism was refactored to use a more granular tctx_lock instead, the protective barrier across the entire free sequence was removed. Consequently, there exists a window where the inflight counter is decremented and wait queues are woken up while another thread might still be accessing or expecting the validity of the tctx structure. This can lead to use-after-free scenarios if the memory is reclaimed before all concurrent readers have exited their critical sections.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, potentially leading to kernel crashes, data corruption, or privilege escalation depending on how an attacker exploits the race condition. By carefully crafting a sequence of io_uring requests and triggering specific exit paths, an adversary could force the kernel to free memory that is still being accessed by another thread. This violates fundamental memory safety principles in the Linux kernel environment where such races can result in arbitrary code execution if the freed memory is reallocated for malicious purposes before the stale pointer is dereferenced. The vulnerability highlights the complexity of managing shared state and reference counting in high-concurrency subsystems like io_uring, which are designed for high-performance asynchronous I/O operations.
To mitigate this risk, the resolution involves modifying the lifecycle management of the tctx structure to adhere strictly to Read-Copy-Update (RCU) principles. The fix requires changing the memory deallocation mechanism from a direct free operation to kfree_rcu(), which ensures that the memory is not actually released until all pre-existing RCU read-side critical sections have completed globally. Furthermore, io_put_task() must be updated to enter an RCU read section before decrementing the inflight counter and performing other operations on the tctx. This guarantees that any concurrent access initiated by non-owner threads will complete safely before the memory is reclaimed. This approach aligns with industry best practices for handling shared data structures in lock-free or low-lock concurrency environments, ensuring that no thread can observe a freed object while it might still be logically active within the system's execution flow.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability maps to CWE-416: Use After Free, as it involves accessing memory after it has been potentially deallocated due to improper synchronization. In terms of adversarial tactics, it relates to techniques found in MITRE ATT&CK that involve exploiting race conditions for denial of service or privilege escalation, specifically within the context of kernel-level exploitation where timing attacks against reference counting mechanisms are a common vector. The fix emphasizes the importance of maintaining proper RCU grace periods when dealing with structures that may be accessed by multiple threads concurrently without holding exclusive locks throughout their entire lifecycle. This ensures system stability and prevents the subtle memory corruption issues that arise from premature deallocation in complex asynchronous I/O frameworks.