CVE-2026-102676 in Electroninfo

Summary

by MITRE • 09/29/2026

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 41.10.6, 42.9.2, 43.4.1, and 44.0.0-beta.5, an Electron <webview> guest could enable nodeIntegrationInWorker for its Web Workers even when the unsandboxed embedder had Node.js integration disabled, allowing untrusted guest content to create a Node-enabled worker with more privilege than the embedder granted. Applications that do not enable the <webview> tag or that keep the embedder sandboxed are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 41.10.6, 42.9.2, 43.4.1, and 44.0.0-beta.5.

If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.

Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 09/29/2026

Electron serves as a foundational framework for developing cross-platform desktop applications by leveraging web technologies such as JavaScript, HTML, and CSS to render user interfaces while providing access to native operating system APIs through Node.js integration. A critical security flaw was identified in the handling of Web Workers within Electron environments prior to versions 41.10.6, 42.9.2, 43.4.1, and 44.0.0-beta.5. This vulnerability stems from an improper privilege separation mechanism where a guest process or context could override security settings intended by the embedder. Specifically, the flaw allowed untrusted guest content to enable nodeIntegrationInWorker for its Web Workers even when the unsandboxed embedmer had explicitly disabled Node.js integration. This discrepancy created a situation where code running in a worker thread gained access to powerful Node.js APIs that were supposed to be restricted based on the parent application's security configuration, effectively bypassing intended sandbox boundaries and elevating privileges beyond what was granted by the embedding context.

The technical root of this issue lies in how Electron manages the inheritance and enforcement of security flags across different execution contexts within its multi-process architecture. When an embedder configures a window or frame to disable Node.js integration for safety, it expects all child processes, including Web Workers spawned from that context, to adhere to those restrictions. However, due to this vulnerability, guest content could manipulate the configuration state of these workers independently of the parent's security posture. This allowed malicious scripts loaded into an iframe or a similar embedded container to execute arbitrary Node.js code within a worker thread. Such execution provides access to file system operations, network requests, and other native capabilities that are typically blocked in sandboxed web contexts, thereby undermining the isolation model designed to protect users from untrusted content rendered by Electron applications.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for any application relying on iframe embedding or guest processes without fully enabling nodeIntegration across all components. Attackers who can inject malicious scripts into a vulnerable page could exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary code with higher privileges than anticipated, potentially leading to remote code execution, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the host system if additional security controls are absent. The risk is particularly acute for applications that mix trusted and untrusted content in the same window but rely on sandboxing to mitigate risks from the untrusted portions. However, it is important to note that applications which do not enable nodeIntegration at all, or those that keep the embedder strictly sandboxed without allowing guest overrides, are generally not affected by this specific privilege escalation path because they either lack the mechanism for Node.js execution entirely or enforce stricter isolation policies that prevent such configuration tampering.

To mitigate this vulnerability and ensure robust security posture, developers must upgrade their Electron dependencies to version 41.10.6, 42.9.2, 43.4.1, or later stable releases where the logic for inheriting sandbox settings in Web Workers has been corrected. Beyond updating libraries, it is advisable to adhere to security best practices by avoiding nodeIntegrationInWorker unless absolutely necessary and ensuring that any content loaded into iframes or guest contexts is fully trusted. Implementing strict Content Security Policies can also help restrict script execution sources and reduce the attack surface for injection-based exploits. This issue aligns with CWE-250, which describes Execution with Unnecessary Privileges, as it involves a process executing code with elevated permissions that are not required for its intended function. Furthermore, from an adversary perspective, this vulnerability facilitates techniques associated with ATT&CK T1610, specifically the exploitation of sandbox escape mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to system resources and execute arbitrary commands within a desktop application environment.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

09/29/2026

Disclosure

09/29/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

Interested in the pricing of exploits?

See the underground prices here!