CVE-2026-107021 in AnyMemo
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
Insecure permissions in the CardProvider content provider component of helloworld1 AnyMemo versionCode 20260730 allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily read flashcards across the user's entire memorization database.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified within the CardProvider content provider component of the AnyMemo application, specifically in build version code 20260730, represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms for sensitive user data. Content providers are standard Android components designed to manage access to a structured set of data, often serving as an interface between processes or applications. In this instance, the implementation fails to enforce appropriate permission checks when handling read operations on flashcard datasets. This misconfiguration allows any application installed on the device, regardless of its own security permissions or trust level, to query and retrieve content from the CardProvider without requiring explicit authorization from the user or the system. The flaw stems directly from insecure default permissions where the provider is exported but lacks restrictive android:permission attributes that would limit access to privileged applications only.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management and CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The root cause lies in the AndroidManifest.xml configuration where the content provider is exposed publicly without sufficient safeguards. When an attacker invokes a ContentResolver query against the CardProvider authority, the system does not validate whether the calling application has been granted the necessary READ permission. Consequently, the underlying SQLite database containing all memorization data becomes accessible to any process on the device. This bypasses Android's standard sandboxing model which is intended to isolate applications from one another and protect user privacy by restricting cross-application data access unless explicitly permitted.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe regarding user confidentiality and data integrity. Since flashcards often contain personal study materials, professional certification details, or potentially sensitive educational content, unauthorized access constitutes a significant breach of privacy. An attacker with minimal privileges can enumerate the entire memorization database, extracting all cards including their questions, answers, metadata, and learning statistics. This capability enables targeted phishing attacks if the data contains organizational information, or general espionage where an adversary builds a profile of the user's interests and knowledge base based on what they are studying. There is no indication that this vulnerability allows for remote code execution or direct system compromise, but it facilitates extensive unauthorized data exfiltration which can be leveraged in subsequent attack chains such as social engineering or credential stuffing if passwords were stored within flashcards.
Mitigation strategies must focus on tightening the security configuration of the content provider component. The primary remediation involves modifying the AndroidManifest.xml to remove the exported attribute or explicitly setting it to false, thereby preventing external applications from accessing the provider entirely unless absolutely necessary for inter-app communication. If cross-application access is required, developers should implement strict permission checks using Context.checkCallingPermission() within the query method of the ContentProvider class and define a custom dangerous permission in the manifest that requesting apps must declare and have granted by the user via runtime permissions. Additionally, implementing data encryption at rest ensures that even if an attacker bypasses these controls through other means or exploits related vulnerabilities, the underlying database remains unreadable without the proper decryption keys derived from user credentials. Regular security audits of content provider implementations are essential to prevent similar privilege escalation flaws in future updates.