CVE-2026-110120 in Yshopmall
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
Yshopmall through 2.0.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the after-sales API that allows authenticated members to access other members' data by supplying their after-sales id and orderCode. Attackers can call deleteAfterSalesOrder, addLogisticsInformation, or GET /applyForAfterSales/{key} to view other members' order items and tamper with or delete their after-sales records.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in Yshopmall versions up to 2.0.0 represents a classic case of insecure direct object reference within the application's after-sales management module. This flaw stems from insufficient authorization checks on server-side endpoints that handle sensitive customer data and operational workflows. Specifically, the API functions responsible for managing after-sales orders fail to validate whether the authenticated user initiating the request is the legitimate owner of the target resource. Instead of binding access control decisions to session context or verifying ownership through database queries linked to the current user's identity, the application relies solely on client-supplied identifiers such as after-sales IDs and order codes. This architectural oversight allows any authenticated member to manipulate resources belonging to other users by simply guessing or enumerating valid identifier values.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability manifests in several critical API endpoints including deleteAfterSalesOrder, addLogisticsInformation, and GET /applyForAfterSales/{key}. When an attacker authenticates as a legitimate user, they can construct HTTP requests targeting arbitrary after-sales records by injecting specific IDs into these parameters. The server processes these requests without cross-referencing the provided identifiers against the authenticated session's associated data set. Consequently, this enables unauthorized read access to confidential order items and personal information of other customers. Furthermore, it permits write operations that allow attackers to tamper with logistics details or completely delete after-sales records, thereby disrupting business continuity and potentially causing financial loss for affected merchants and consumers.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it compromises both confidentiality and integrity within the e-commerce platform. Confidentiality is breached because sensitive customer data becomes accessible to unauthorized parties who can scrape order histories, product details, and shipping information. Integrity is compromised through the ability to alter or erase after-sales records, which may lead to incorrect refund processing, false logistics tracking updates, or loss of evidence in dispute resolutions. This type of attack vector is particularly dangerous because it does not require complex exploitation techniques; a simple script can iterate through sequential IDs to harvest large volumes of data or disrupt operations systematically.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-639, which describes the injection of direct object references that are not properly validated against access control policies. It also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically Valid Accounts, as it leverages legitimate credentials to perform unauthorized actions due to flawed authorization logic rather than credential theft or privilege escalation. The lack of proper indirect reference mapping means the application fails to enforce role-based or object-level access controls effectively.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must implement robust server-side authorization checks on all after-sales API endpoints. This involves ensuring that every request validates whether the authenticated user owns the requested resource by querying the database with both the resource identifier and the current user's ID. Additionally, implementing indirect reference maps where internal IDs are replaced with opaque, randomly generated tokens can reduce the risk of enumeration attacks. Regular security testing including automated penetration tests focused on broken access control is essential to detect such flaws early in the development lifecycle.