CVE-2026-111330 in JuggleIM
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
JuggleIM im-server through 1.8.16 contains a weak password hashing vulnerability that stores admin console passwords as unsalted SHA-1 digests via tools.SHA1 in services/accountservice.go. Attackers who obtain the accounts table through database access or backups can crack console passwords using precomputed tables or GPU brute force.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The JuggleIM im-server, specifically versions up to 1.8.16, suffers from a critical weakness in its authentication credential storage mechanism that fundamentally compromises the security of administrative accounts. The vulnerability stems from the implementation within services/accountservice.go, where the tools.SHA1 function is utilized to hash passwords for the admin console. This approach results in the storage of unsalted SHA-1 digests rather than employing modern, computationally intensive hashing algorithms designed to resist brute-force attacks. By relying on a fast cryptographic hash function without the addition of random salt values, the system fails to meet basic security hygiene standards required for protecting sensitive administrative credentials against offline cracking attempts.
From a technical perspective, the use of unsalted SHA-1 presents two distinct and severe risks that significantly lower the barrier for attackers seeking unauthorized access. First, SHA-1 is an extremely fast hashing algorithm compared to modern password hashing functions like bcrypt, Argon2, or scrypt. This speed allows adversaries to perform billions of hash computations per second using standard consumer hardware or specialized GPU clusters, drastically reducing the time required to reverse-engineer weak passwords. Second, the absence of salt means that identical passwords across different user accounts produce identical hashes. More critically for this specific vulnerability, it enables the use of precomputed lookup tables known as rainbow tables. Attackers can generate massive databases mapping common password strings directly to their SHA-1 hash values, allowing them to instantly identify plaintext passwords by simply comparing against these tables without performing any real-time computation during an attack phase.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for organizations relying on JuggleIM for communication infrastructure. If an attacker gains access to the underlying database through SQL injection, server misconfiguration, or stolen backups, they can extract the accounts table containing these weak hashes. Once obtained, the administrative console passwords are effectively exposed within a short timeframe using readily available cracking tools such as Hashcat or John the Ripper. Successful exploitation grants the adversary full control over the admin console, which typically provides access to user management, message routing configurations, and potentially sensitive communication data stored within the platform. This level of compromise can lead to significant data breaches, service disruption, and further lateral movement into other network segments if administrative credentials are reused elsewhere in the organization's IT ecosystem.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-759: Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt, which highlights the failure to incorporate random data that ensures unique hash outputs for identical inputs. Furthermore, it relates closely to CWE-328: Reversible One-Way Hash, as SHA-1 is considered cryptographically broken and unsuitable for password storage due to its susceptibility to collision attacks and rapid cracking capabilities. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this flaw facilitates the T1110: Brute Force technique within the MITRE ATT&CK matrix, specifically enabling offline brute-forcing where attackers do not need to interact with live authentication services, thereby avoiding detection by intrusion detection systems that monitor for failed login attempts on network ports.
To mitigate this vulnerability and restore security posture, immediate remediation is required upon upgrading past version 1.8.16 or applying available patches if provided by the vendor. The primary technical fix involves replacing the SHA-1 hashing implementation with a robust password hashing algorithm such as bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2id. These algorithms are specifically designed to be computationally expensive and memory-hard, effectively neutralizing GPU-based brute-force attacks. Additionally, ensuring that every user account is assigned a unique, cryptographically secure random salt during the hashing process is mandatory to prevent rainbow table attacks and ensure that identical passwords result in distinct hash outputs. Beyond technical fixes, organizations should enforce strong password policies requiring high entropy for administrative accounts and consider implementing multi-factor authentication where supported by the platform architecture to provide an additional layer of defense even if credential hashes are eventually compromised.