CVE-2026-111320 in ValueCell
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
ValueCell through 0.1.20 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows remote attackers to direct backend requests by setting an unvalidated provider base_url. Attackers can set base_url via the provider config endpoint and trigger POST /api/v1/models/check to reach internal or metadata addresses, read error responses, and capture stored provider API keys.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
ValueCell versions through 0.1.20 are susceptible to a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability that stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied input within the application's configuration endpoints. This flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to manipulate the backend service into making HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations by exploiting an improperly validated provider base_url parameter. The core technical deficiency lies in the lack of rigorous allow-listing or strict schema enforcement for URLs provided during the initialization or modification of provider configurations, which violates fundamental principles of secure input handling and trust boundary management.
The exploitation vector involves interacting with the provider config endpoint to inject a maliciously crafted base_url that points towards internal network resources, cloud metadata services such as AWS EC2 instance metadata, or other sensitive backend infrastructure addresses. Once this configuration is accepted by the application without adequate sanitization, an attacker can trigger subsequent API calls, specifically targeting the POST /api/v1/models/check endpoint. This action causes the server to execute requests on behalf of the client using the injected URL, effectively bypassing network-level access controls that might otherwise restrict external traffic from reaching internal services due to their private IP ranges or firewall rules.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it enables attackers to perform unauthorized reconnaissance and data exfiltration against internal systems that are not directly exposed to the internet. By directing these forged requests, adversaries can probe for open ports, identify running services, and potentially access sensitive metadata endpoints that expose cloud credentials or instance identity information. Furthermore, because the application processes API keys associated with various providers, successful exploitation allows attackers to capture stored provider API keys embedded in error responses or response bodies returned by the internal targets. This compromise of authentication tokens can lead to further lateral movement within the network and unauthorized access to third-party services integrated with ValueCell.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery, which describes flaws where a web server retrieves data from a user-supplied URL without proper validation. Additionally, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, as the attacker leverages the victim application's trust in its own network environment to intercept or manipulate communications between internal components. The ability to read error responses and capture API keys also relates to CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information, highlighting how improper error handling can exacerbate the severity of initial access flaws by leaking confidential credentials.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation should focus on implementing strict input validation for all URL parameters, particularly those used in configuration endpoints that influence backend request routing. Developers must enforce allow-listing mechanisms to restrict base_url values to a predefined set of trusted domains or IP ranges, ensuring that requests cannot be redirected to internal network segments or cloud metadata services. It is also critical to implement robust error handling practices that do not expose sensitive data such as API keys in response payloads when errors occur during backend communication. Network-level controls should complement these application fixes by segmenting internal services and restricting outbound traffic from the ValueCell server, thereby limiting the blast radius even if an attacker successfully exploits this vulnerability.