CVE-2026-111323 in RedAmon
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
RedAmon through 7.0.1 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in the agent POST /tradecraft/verify endpoint because validate_url checks only the initial hostname. Attackers can submit a public URL that redirects or DNS-rebinds to internal addresses like cloud metadata services, receiving fetched content through the model-generated summary.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The RedAmon software suite, specifically versions up to and including 7.0.1, contains a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability within its agent communication module. This flaw is located in the POST /tradecraft/verify endpoint, which is designed to validate URLs provided by users or external systems before processing them through an AI model for summary generation. The core technical deficiency lies in the implementation of the validate_url function, which performs a superficial check on only the initial hostname of the submitted URL. This incomplete validation logic fails to account for subsequent network behaviors such as HTTP redirects or DNS rebinding attacks, allowing attackers to bypass security controls and force the server to make requests to internal resources that should be inaccessible from the public internet.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables unauthenticated actors to exploit the application's trust in its own URL validation mechanism. By submitting a publicly accessible URL that is configured to redirect or utilize DNS rebinding techniques, an attacker can manipulate the target server into resolving and connecting to internal IP addresses. A primary target for such attacks is cloud metadata services, which are commonly hosted on non-routable private IP ranges like 169.254.169.254 in AWS or similar endpoints in other cloud providers. These services contain sensitive authentication credentials, instance identity documents, and configuration data that are critical to the security of the underlying infrastructure. Because the vulnerability is unauthenticated, any external actor with network access to the RedAmon service can initiate these requests without needing valid user credentials, significantly lowering the barrier for exploitation.
The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure. The fetched content from internal services is processed by an AI model and returned as a generated summary through the application interface. This creates a direct data exfiltration channel where sensitive cloud metadata or internal network responses are transmitted back to the attacker in a readable format. This aligns with CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws resulting from insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs. Furthermore, this attack vector maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1504.003, specifically Cloud Infrastructure Discovery via DNS rebinding or redirect abuse, as well as T1651, which covers cloud service discovery through metadata services. The ability to access these internal endpoints can lead to full compromise of the associated cloud instance if credentials are leaked and subsequently used for lateral movement or privilege escalation within the environment.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation should involve upgrading RedAmon to a version where the validate_url function has been hardened to perform comprehensive validation against redirects and DNS resolutions. Security controls must be implemented to ensure that any outbound requests initiated by the server are strictly validated not just at the initial hostname level but also after every redirect hop or DNS resolution step. It is essential to maintain an allowlist of permitted domains rather than relying on blocklists, as this approach prevents bypasses via newly discovered internal endpoints. Additionally, network-level mitigations such as egress filtering should be enforced to prevent the application server from reaching private IP ranges and cloud metadata service addresses entirely. Implementing these controls ensures that even if a vulnerability exists in the application logic, the underlying infrastructure remains protected against SSRF-based data exfiltration attacks.