CVE-2026-111460 in OnCell G3150A-LTE
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
A hard-coded cryptographic key vulnerability exists in the OnCell G3150A-LTE Series. Under certain conditions, an unauthenticated remote attacker could obtain shared cryptographic key material and use it to impersonate affected devices that have not regenerated their cryptographic keys, potentially compromising the confidentiality and integrity of management communications.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The vulnerability identified in the OnCell G3150A-LTE Series represents a critical failure in secure bootstrapping practices, specifically categorized under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials. This flaw stems from the implementation of static cryptographic keys embedded directly within the device firmware or configuration files rather than being dynamically generated during manufacturing or provisioning processes. In modern telecommunications infrastructure, devices such as LTE base stations rely on robust mutual authentication mechanisms to establish secure management sessions with network controllers and orchestration systems. When these critical secret values are hardcoded, they become a single point of failure that can be extracted through reverse engineering, memory dumping, or access to firmware images if the device is physically compromised or if update packages are intercepted. The presence of such static keys fundamentally undermines the trust model required for secure network operations, as it allows any actor with knowledge of these constants to bypass authentication protocols entirely.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables unauthenticated remote attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against management communications. By obtaining the shared cryptographic key material, an adversary can decrypt existing traffic or encrypt malicious commands that appear legitimate to the receiving network elements. This capability allows for significant impersonation of affected devices that have not regenerated their keys through standard maintenance procedures. The impact extends beyond simple eavesdropping; it permits active manipulation of device configurations, potentially leading to service denial by misconfiguring radio parameters, redirecting traffic to malicious nodes, or extracting sensitive subscriber data if the management plane interfaces with core network functions. Such actions can disrupt local cellular coverage and compromise the integrity of broader mobile broadband services dependent on these base stations for connectivity.
The exploitation path aligns closely with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Initial Access and Defense Evasion, particularly those involving valid accounts or credentials obtained through other means, although in this case, the credentials are static rather than stolen from a user account. The attacker leverages CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation concepts by exploiting the lack of dynamic key rotation mechanisms that would otherwise invalidate compromised keys over time. Without automatic regeneration policies enforced at the firmware level or via secure remote management protocols like TR-069 with proper mutual TLS authentication, the device remains perpetually vulnerable to replay attacks and session hijacking once the static key is discovered. This creates a persistent backdoor into the network infrastructure that persists until manual intervention occurs.
Mitigation strategies must focus on eliminating hard-coded secrets from production firmware builds immediately. Vendors should implement secure element hardware or trusted platform modules to store cryptographic keys in tamper-resistant storage, ensuring they are unique per device and generated during manufacturing rather than embedded statically. For existing deployments, administrators should enforce regular key rotation policies through supported management interfaces if available, although this may be limited by the firmware's current capabilities. Network operators must also segment management traffic using VLANs or dedicated physical networks to limit lateral movement in case of compromise. Additionally, monitoring for anomalous configuration changes and unexpected authentication successes from unknown IP addresses can help detect exploitation attempts early. Future procurement should prioritize equipment that adheres to strict cryptographic standards such as NIST SP 800-57 guidelines for key management, ensuring dynamic generation and secure storage mechanisms are present by design rather than added as an afterthought.