CVE-2026-65210 in MBD-X12SPI
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
This issue may allow an authenticated IPMI Administrator to read arbitrary files from the BMC filesystem, disclosing material well beyond the intended IPMI management role.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The vulnerability described represents a critical authorization bypass within the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) subsystem of Baseboard Management Controller firmware. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker who has already obtained authenticated credentials with the IPMI Administrator role can access and read arbitrary files from the BMC filesystem. This capability fundamentally undermines the security boundary between management interfaces and underlying system resources, allowing for the extraction of sensitive configuration data, cryptographic keys, or other material that is not intended to be exposed through standard remote management protocols. The existence of this vulnerability indicates a failure in input validation and access control mechanisms within the IPMI implementation, where the privilege level assigned to an administrator account does strictly align with the actual permissions enforced by the backend file system handlers.
From a technical perspective, this issue is classified under CWE-269, which denotes Improper Privilege Control, as well as CWE-732, which covers Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The root cause likely stems from insufficient separation of duties or overly permissive access controls within the BMC software stack. When an authenticated session is established via IPMI commands such as Get Device ID or specific OEM-specific extensions, the system fails to restrict file path traversal or directory listing operations that should be limited by role-based policies. This allows the administrator account to traverse beyond its designated scope and retrieve files stored in directories typically reserved for higher-privilege services or internal BMC processes. The lack of strict sandboxing between different functional components of the BMC firmware enables this lateral movement within the local file system, turning a standard administrative function into a powerful data exfiltration vector.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in enterprise environments where IPMI is used for out-of-band management. An attacker with physical or network access to the management interface can leverage this flaw to harvest sensitive information such as SSH private keys, SSL certificates, SNMP community strings, or database credentials stored on the BMC. This disclosure facilitates further attacks including credential reuse across other systems, man-in-the-middle attacks using stolen certificates, and deeper compromise of the host server by revealing internal network configurations. Since IPMI is often accessible from separate management networks that may have broader reach than production networks, this vulnerability significantly expands the attack surface for adversaries targeting infrastructure security. It effectively neutralizes the confidentiality guarantees provided by role-based access control models in hardware management platforms.
To mitigate this risk, organizations should immediately apply vendor-provided firmware updates that address these permission checks and enforce stricter file system isolation within the BMC environment. If patching is not immediately feasible, administrators should restrict network access to IPMI interfaces using firewalls or VLAN segmentation to limit exposure to trusted management subnets only. Additionally, changing default passwords and ensuring strong authentication policies are critical first steps, though they do not fully resolve this specific flaw since it affects authenticated administrator accounts. Monitoring logs for unusual file read operations via IPMI commands can also aid in detecting potential exploitation attempts. Long-term remediation involves adopting more secure remote management standards such as Redfish over RESTful APIs with proper OAuth or certificate-based authentication, which offer better auditability and granular access controls compared to legacy IPMI implementations.