CVE-2026-111616 in Oqtane
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
Oqtane Framework through 10.2.6 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in SettingController that allows a site administrator to read another co-tenant site's private settings. Attackers with the Administrators role on one site can request another site's entityId through their own alias to retrieve stored SMTPPassword and SMTPClientSecret values.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The Oqtane Framework, specifically versions up to 10.2.6, contains a critical authorization bypass vulnerability within its SettingController component that undermines the multi-tenant security model inherent in SaaS architectures. This flaw allows an authenticated user with administrative privileges on one tenant site to access and exfiltrate sensitive configuration data from other co-hosted sites. The core of the issue lies in how the framework validates ownership or scope for settings requests, failing to strictly enforce that a requestor must be associated with the specific entity ID they are attempting to query. Instead, the system appears to rely on insufficient checks regarding tenant isolation, allowing an attacker to manipulate input parameters such as entityId by substituting it with identifiers from other sites accessible via their own alias or through enumeration techniques.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability represents a classic Broken Access Control issue where role-based permissions are not correctly mapped to resource-level ownership constraints. An attacker leveraging the Administrators role on Site A can craft requests targeting the SettingController endpoints associated with Site B. By injecting or selecting different entity identifiers corresponding to other tenants within the same Oqtane instance, the application fails to verify that the current user context has legitimate access rights to those specific resources. This lack of proper object-level authorization check enables unauthorized data retrieval across tenant boundaries, effectively breaking the logical isolation required for secure multi-tenancy implementations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the nature of the exposed data. The SettingController stores critical infrastructure credentials including SMTPPassword and SMTPClientSecret values used for email transmission services. Compromise of these secrets allows an attacker on one tenant site to gain control over the email sending capabilities of other tenants within the same Oqtane deployment. This can lead to further attacks such as phishing campaigns, account takeover via password reset emails sent from compromised mail servers, or reputation damage for affected organizations. Since SMTP credentials are often reused across services, this breach may also facilitate lateral movement into internal networks if those passwords are shared with other systems.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and specifically falls under the ATT&CK technique T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object or potentially T1078 Valid Accounts depending on how initial access was achieved, though in this context it is primarily an abuse of legitimate administrative privileges. To mitigate this risk, organizations running Oqtane Framework must immediately upgrade to version 10.2.6 or later where the authorization logic has been corrected to enforce strict tenant isolation checks during setting retrieval operations. Additionally, administrators should rotate all exposed SMTP credentials and any other secrets that may have been compromised if an exploit was detected in their environment. Implementing robust input validation on entity identifiers and ensuring that access control middleware correctly validates user-tenant relationships before processing requests are essential defensive measures for maintaining multi-tenant security integrity.