CVE-2026-112500 in iOS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/26/2026
A logic issue was addressed with improved restrictions. This issue is fixed in iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, visionOS 27.2. The user's original email address may be leaked when using the Hide My Email feature.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/26/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a logic flaw within Apple’s privacy-centric infrastructure, specifically affecting the Hide My Email service available across iOS, iPadOS, macOS, and visionOS platforms. This feature is designed to generate unique, randomized email aliases that forward messages to a user's real inbox while keeping their actual address hidden from third-party services. The core technical failure lies in how these generated aliases are managed or displayed during specific operational states, leading to an unintended disclosure of the underlying primary email address. Rather than a traditional buffer overflow or injection attack, this is a logical error where the application fails to enforce strict separation between the alias and the real identity when rendering user interface elements or processing backend requests related to account management.
From a technical perspective, the flaw likely stems from improper validation or sanitization of data passed through the Hide My Email API endpoints. When users interact with their email aliases—such as viewing them in settings, managing forwarding rules, or interacting with third-party apps that utilize these addresses—the system may inadvertently expose the original email address stored in the user's Apple ID profile. This could occur if the frontend interface incorrectly binds data from a secure context to an insecure display area, or if backend APIs return excessive information without proper filtering based on the current authentication scope. The issue highlights a common challenge in privacy features where convenience and ease of management can inadvertently compromise the very anonymity they are meant to provide.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for users who rely on Hide My Email to maintain their digital privacy. By leaking the original email address, attackers or malicious third-party applications could potentially correlate anonymous online activities with a user's real-world identity. This undermines the fundamental purpose of the feature and may facilitate targeted phishing attacks, social engineering campaigns, or unauthorized tracking across different services. Since this affects major operating systems including iOS 27.2, iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, and visionOS 27.2, a large user base is potentially exposed to this risk until the patch is applied. The exposure could also aid in account takeover attempts if combined with other information gathered from social media or data breaches.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-200: Information Exposure, where sensitive system information is made available to unauthorized actors without explicit intent. It may also relate to CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor, as the leaked email address constitutes personally identifiable information (PII). In terms of attack vectors, this could be exploited via local privilege escalation if a malicious app on the same device accesses system APIs improperly, or through remote exploitation if web services interacting with Apple's identity infrastructure are tricked into revealing more data than intended. The ATT&CK framework would categorize this under T1078: Valid Accounts, as it involves leveraging legitimate credentials to access sensitive user attributes that should remain obscured during specific operations.
Mitigation for this issue primarily relies on the deployment of the provided software updates in iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, and visionOS 27.2. These patches introduce improved restrictions within the Hide My Email logic to ensure that the original email address is never exposed during alias management or display operations. Users should immediately update their devices to these versions to close this information leakage channel. Additionally, Apple has likely implemented stricter input validation and output encoding checks in the backend services handling alias requests to prevent any accidental data bleed between secure and non-secure contexts. For developers integrating with Apple's identity systems, it is crucial to review API responses for excessive data exposure and ensure that privacy-sensitive fields are masked appropriately based on user permissions and context.