CVE-2026-112511 in macOS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/26/2026
A path handling issue was addressed with improved logic. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. A malicious Screen Sharing peer may be able to create arbitrary symlinks as root.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The vulnerability described involves a critical path handling flaw within the Screen Sharing service on Apple operating systems, specifically affecting versions prior to macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, and macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. This issue stems from insufficient validation of file paths during symlink creation operations performed by the Screen Sharing daemon. When a malicious peer establishes a connection via the Screen Sharing protocol, they can exploit this logic error to trick the system into creating symbolic links at arbitrary locations on the filesystem with root privileges. The core technical flaw lies in the lack of rigorous checks to ensure that the target path for the symlink resides within an expected or safe directory structure, allowing attackers to bypass standard permission boundaries and write link targets outside of intended scopes.
From a security classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access, commonly known as a symbolic link following attack. The attacker leverages the race condition or logic gap in path resolution to manipulate where the symlink points, effectively gaining the ability to write data to locations typically restricted by standard user permissions. This is further contextualized within the MITRE ATT&CK framework under techniques related to Privilege Escalation and Defense Evasion, as it allows an unprivileged remote actor to achieve root-level file system modifications without direct authentication or exploitation of a separate privilege escalation vector like kernel exploits.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the elevation of privileges involved. Since the symlink creation occurs with root permissions, an attacker can create symlinks that point to sensitive configuration files, binary executables, or other critical system resources. By subsequently manipulating these targets through the Screen Sharing interface, the attacker could potentially overwrite essential system binaries, inject malicious code into startup scripts, or alter security configurations such as authentication mechanisms and firewall rules. This capability effectively grants full control over the affected macOS device, enabling persistent access, data exfiltration, lateral movement within a network if the machine serves as an infrastructure component, and complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for all users on the system.
Mitigation strategies primarily involve applying the vendor-provided software updates immediately upon release or availability. For organizations managing large fleets of macOS devices, automated patch management systems should be configured to prioritize these specific version updates across Golden Gate, Sequoia, and Tahoe releases. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible due to operational constraints, network segmentation can help isolate Screen Sharing services from untrusted networks, ensuring that only authenticated and authorized peers within a trusted internal segment can initiate connections. Additionally, monitoring for unusual file system changes or symlink creations in sensitive directories using endpoint detection and response tools may provide early warning indicators of exploitation attempts before significant damage occurs.