CVE-2026-75334 in smart-web2
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
The report module in the backend of smart-web2 v1.3.1 is vulnerable to arbitrary SQL execution. The sqlResource.sql parameter is stored in the t_report_sql_resource table through the ReportController.save() interface and directly embedded into Hibernate native queries without any parameterization or filtering.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The vulnerability identified within the smart-web2 application version 1.3.1 represents a critical security flaw located in the backend reporting module, specifically affecting the data persistence layer responsible for handling SQL resource definitions. This issue stems from an improper implementation of database interaction mechanisms where user-supplied input is not adequately sanitized or parameterized before being incorporated into executable commands. The core of the problem lies within the ReportController.save() interface, which serves as the entry point for storing report configurations and associated query logic into the system's persistent storage. When a request is processed by this endpoint, the application accepts a value designated as sqlResource.sql from the incoming payload and proceeds to store it directly into the t_report_sql_resource database table without performing any validation checks or encoding procedures that would neutralize malicious syntax.
This lack of input sanitization creates a direct pathway for SQL injection attacks against the underlying database management system. Because the stored data is subsequently retrieved and embedded into Hibernate native queries, an attacker who gains write access to this interface can inject arbitrary Structured Query Language statements. The vulnerability allows for the execution of complex commands that go beyond simple data exfiltration, potentially enabling attackers to modify existing records, delete critical application data, or escalate privileges within the database environment depending on the permissions granted to the application's database user account. This type of flaw is classified under Common Weakness Enumeration as CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, highlighting the failure to properly handle special characters and command structures that could alter the intended logic of a query.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability poses severe risks to data integrity and confidentiality within the smart-web2 ecosystem. An attacker can leverage this flaw to bypass authentication mechanisms if the injected queries target user tables or administrative functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive business intelligence reports or customer information stored in the system. Furthermore, because the malicious SQL is persisted in the database before execution, the impact extends beyond a single request; once the payload is saved, it may be executed whenever the reporting module attempts to render data based on that resource, creating a persistent backdoor within the application's logic layer. This persistence makes detection more difficult as standard web application firewall logs might not immediately flag stored payloads until they are actively processed by the backend service.
The technical execution of this attack relies on the specific behavior of Hibernate native queries when handling string concatenation or direct embedding without prepared statement parameters. By injecting syntactically correct SQL fragments, an attacker can manipulate the query structure to return unintended results or trigger side effects such as data modification commands like UPDATE or DELETE statements embedded within a SELECT context through techniques like stacked queries if supported by the database engine. This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically SQL injection variants, where attackers use specialized syntax to interact directly with backend systems rather than relying on higher-level application logic flaws alone.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts must focus on refactoring the data access layer to enforce strict parameterization of all database queries. Developers should replace direct string concatenation or embedding in Hibernate native queries with prepared statements that utilize positional parameters, ensuring that user input is treated strictly as data rather than executable code. Additionally implementing a robust Input Validation framework using allow-lists for expected SQL patterns can provide an extra layer of defense against unexpected syntax injection. It is also recommended to apply the principle of least privilege to the database account used by the application, restricting permissions so that even if successful exploitation occurs, the attacker cannot perform destructive operations such as dropping tables or modifying system configurations. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools configured to detect SQL injection patterns should be integrated into the development lifecycle to prevent similar issues in future releases of the smart-web2 platform.