CVE-2025-61478 in SPC5300.000 Main Board
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
An issue in Vanderbilt Industries, Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board v.3.14.1 allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service via Spoofed SYN packets.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The vulnerability identified within the Vanderbilt Industries Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board, specifically in firmware version 3.14.1, represents a significant security flaw related to network stack resilience against spoofed traffic. This device is commonly deployed as part of access control and physical security infrastructure, where continuous availability is critical for maintaining secure premises. The core technical issue lies in the handling of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN packets during the initial handshake phase of connection establishment. When a physically proximate attacker sends crafted or spoofed TCP SYN packets to the device's network interface, the system fails to adequately validate the source address or implement sufficient rate-limiting mechanisms for half-open connections. This lack of robust input validation and state management allows an adversary to exhaust available resources on the target hardware by initiating numerous incomplete connection attempts that consume memory and processing cycles without completing the handshake process.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-400, which describes uncontrolled resource consumption, specifically in the context of denial-of-service conditions caused by improper handling of network inputs. The vulnerability exploits weaknesses typically associated with CVE-2019-11587 or similar TCP stack vulnerabilities found in embedded systems that do not implement SYN cookies or equivalent mitigation techniques designed to protect against IP spoofing and connection exhaustion attacks. Because the SPC5300 is an embedded device often operating on constrained hardware resources, its ability to handle a high volume of simultaneous half-open connections is limited compared to enterprise-grade servers with dedicated DDoS protection layers. The absence of these protections means that even a moderate rate of spoofed SYN packets can overwhelm the system's connection table or CPU capacity, leading to service degradation or complete unresponsiveness.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for organizations relying on the Acre Security SPC5300 for critical access control functions. A successful denial-of-service attack could result in the inability to authenticate users via card readers, keypads, or biometric scanners integrated with the main board. In a physical security context, this creates a dual risk: it can lock legitimate personnel out of secure areas during an emergency situation, potentially violating safety regulations and operational continuity requirements. Conversely, if the system fails in a way that defaults to open access due to software errors triggered by the resource exhaustion, it could allow unauthorized individuals to bypass security controls entirely. The requirement for physical proximity limits the attack surface significantly compared to remote exploits but does not eliminate the threat, particularly in environments where insiders or malicious actors with temporary facility access are present.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate operational adjustments and long-term architectural improvements. Since this is a firmware-level issue within an embedded device, patching may require updating the main board software to a version that implements proper SYN cookie support or TCP connection rate limiting features if such updates have been released by Vanderbilt Industries. In the interim, network segmentation should be enforced to isolate the security control systems from general corporate networks and untrusted zones. Deploying hardware-based intrusion prevention systems at the network perimeter can help filter out spoofed packets before they reach the vulnerable device. Additionally, implementing strict access controls on physical ports where these devices are connected ensures that only authorized personnel have the opportunity to inject malicious traffic into the local area network segment hosting the SPC5300 units. Regular monitoring of connection states and resource utilization metrics can also aid in early detection of such attacks, allowing administrators to respond before a full denial-of-service condition is achieved.