CVE-2026-68000 in MCMS
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
The front-end interface /cms/category/list of MCMS <=6.2.0 is vulnerable to SQL injection. The size parameter is directly concatenated into the LIMIT clause of SQL through FreeMarker ${size} without being parameterized and bound. The built-in SqlInjectionUtil employs regular expression blacklist filtering, yet keywords like CREATE/TABLE/SET/PREPARE/EXECUTE are not included in the list, allowing for bypassing. Attackers can execute stacked SQL statements without logging in.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The vulnerability identified in MCMS versions 6.2.0 and earlier represents a critical security flaw within its content management system's front-end interface, specifically targeting the /cms/category/list endpoint. This issue stems from improper input validation and sanitization practices when handling user-supplied data for database queries. The core technical failure lies in how the size parameter is processed by the application logic. Instead of utilizing prepared statements with parameterized queries to safely bind values to SQL commands, the system directly concatenates the value into the LIMIT clause using FreeMarker template syntax ${size}. This approach treats dynamic input as executable code rather than static data, creating a classic injection vector that allows attackers to manipulate the underlying database structure and content.
The mechanism of exploitation is further enabled by weaknesses in the application's defense-in-depth strategy. MCMS employs a built-in utility class named SqlInjectionUtil which attempts to mitigate SQL injection attacks through regular expression-based blacklist filtering. However, this security control is fundamentally flawed due to an incomplete list of prohibited keywords. The filter fails to block critical SQL commands such as CREATE TABLE, SET, PREPARE, and EXECUTE. This oversight allows attackers to bypass the existing filters by chaining these unblocked statements together with standard injection payloads. Because the filtering logic does not account for all possible execution contexts or command sequences, it provides a false sense of security while leaving significant attack surfaces exposed.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its authentication-independent nature. Attackers can execute stacked SQL statements without requiring valid credentials or prior login access. This means that any internet-facing instance running the affected version is immediately exploitable by unauthenticated adversaries. By leveraging stacked queries, an attacker can perform a wide range of malicious actions including extracting sensitive data from database tables, modifying system configurations, creating new administrative accounts to maintain persistent access, or even dropping critical tables which could lead to complete service disruption. The ability to execute arbitrary SQL commands effectively grants the attacker full control over the backend database depending on the privileges assigned to the application's database user account.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command and CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information through Information Retrieval if data exfiltration occurs. In terms of adversary tactics, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application for initial access and potentially T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter if the database allows execution of external commands via SQL features like xp_cmdshell in Microsoft SQL Server environments. The lack of authentication requirement places this vulnerability in a high-risk category, similar to many critical CVEs affecting web applications where input validation is insufficient.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation steps are required for all systems running MCMS version 6.2.0 or lower. The primary fix involves refactoring the code responsible for handling the size parameter to use prepared statements with bound parameters instead of string concatenation within FreeMarker templates. This ensures that user input is treated strictly as data and not as part of the SQL command structure, neutralizing injection attempts regardless of the content. Additionally, while defense-in-depth through blacklist filtering should be maintained or improved, it must never replace parameterized queries as the primary security control. If upgrading to a patched version is not immediately possible, implementing a Web Application Firewall with rules specifically targeting stacked query patterns and blocking the identified bypass keywords can provide temporary protection until the code-level fix is deployed. Regular penetration testing focused on SQL injection vectors should also be conducted to verify that no other endpoints suffer from similar implementation flaws.