CVE-2026-56547 in Traveler
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
The Apple profile generated for the Apple built-in Mail, Calendar and Contacts account to synchronize with HCL Traveler requires the Logon Name and Mail Address to be embedded in them. The values cannot be changed later on, so the Apple profile generation page asks for those values and reflects them back in the generated Apple profile. The Apple profile is not usable without additional information and only allows the attacker to attack their own device, but HCL Traveler could at least check that the values submitted and reflected back in the Apple profile are found in the Domino directory entry for the already authenticated user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The vulnerability described involves a logic flaw within the configuration generation process of HCL Traveler when creating Apple profiles for synchronizing with built-in Mail, Calendar, and Contacts accounts on iOS or macOS devices. The core technical issue stems from the requirement that specific identity attributes, namely the Logon Name and Mail Address, must be embedded directly into the generated profile payload to ensure proper synchronization functionality. Because these values are immutable within the context of the Apple profile once generated, the system relies entirely on user input during the initial generation phase to populate these fields. This design creates a situation where the application acts as a passive conduit for data entry without performing adequate validation against authoritative identity sources.
From an operational security perspective, this flaw allows for potential account confusion or misconfiguration if the values submitted do not match the actual directory entries associated with the authenticated user session. While the immediate impact is limited to affecting only the device of the attacker who generated the profile, as they can only configure their own synchronization settings, the underlying principle represents a failure in input validation and identity consistency checks. The system fails to verify that the Logon Name and Mail Address provided by the user actually correspond to the Domino directory entry for the currently authenticated principal. This lack of cross-referencing means that if an attacker were able to manipulate these inputs through other vectors or if there are edge cases in how sessions are managed, it could lead to synchronization with incorrect accounts or exposure of identity information within the profile structure itself.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-20 Improper Input Validation and CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials when considering that the system trusts user-supplied values for critical configuration parameters without verification against a trusted source like an LDAP directory. In terms of attack vectors, this relates to ATT&CK technique T1534 Internal Spearphishing if such misconfigured profiles were distributed maliciously, although in this specific instance, it is more accurately categorized under privilege escalation or identity manipulation flaws where the application fails to enforce strict binding between user session context and configuration parameters. The inability to change these values post-generation exacerbates the risk because any error or intentional misuse during creation results in a persistent misconfiguration on the client device that cannot be easily corrected without regenerating the profile, potentially leading to long-term synchronization issues or data leakage if the wrong mail address is targeted for sync operations.
To mitigate this vulnerability, HCL Traveler should implement strict server-side validation logic before generating and returning any Apple configuration profiles. Specifically, when a user requests an Apple profile, the system must query the Domino directory using the credentials established in the current authenticated session to retrieve the canonical Logon Name and Mail Address associated with that identity. The values submitted by the user during the generation process should be compared against these authoritative records. If there is any discrepancy, the request should be rejected or corrected automatically rather than reflecting potentially incorrect data back into the profile payload. This ensures that the generated configuration accurately reflects the true state of the user's account in the directory service, thereby preventing misconfiguration and ensuring that synchronization targets remain consistent with organizational identity management policies. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on profile generation requests can help mitigate automated abuse attempts targeting this endpoint.