CVE-2025-62341 in Connections
Summary
by MITRE • 08/27/2026
HCL Connections is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF) when an internal server is compromised possibly allowing an attacker to send unauthorized requests in certain scenarios leading to information disclosure or security bypass.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/27/2026
The vulnerability identified within HCL Connections represents a critical Server-Side Request Forgery flaw that exploits the application's ability to process and forward HTTP requests on behalf of authenticated users. This architectural weakness allows an attacker, particularly one who has already compromised an internal server or gained access through other means such as cross-site scripting or weak authentication controls, to manipulate the target system into making unintended requests to internal resources. The core technical flaw lies in the insufficient validation of user-supplied input when constructing outbound network connections from the backend services. Instead of restricting these requests to a predefined whitelist of trusted domains or IP addresses, the application processes URLs provided by the client without adequate sanitization, thereby enabling the attacker to redirect traffic toward internal infrastructure components that are not directly accessible from external networks.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability facilitates severe information disclosure and potential security bypasses. By directing requests to internal endpoints such as metadata services, administrative interfaces, or database connection strings stored in local configuration files, an adversary can extract sensitive data including credentials, session tokens, and proprietary application logic. The impact is compounded by the fact that these requests originate from a trusted server IP address, allowing them to bypass network-based access control lists and firewalls designed to protect internal assets. This effectively neutralizes perimeter defenses, as the malicious activity appears legitimate due to its origin within the trusted zone of the corporate network or cloud environment.
The exploitation scenario typically involves an attacker leveraging existing footholds on compromised systems to inject crafted URLs into fields that trigger server-side requests. These might include features such as link previews, webhook integrations, proxy functionalities, or any module where the application fetches content from a user-specified source. Once executed, the internal service resolves and connects to the specified target, which could be an internal API endpoint, a cloud instance metadata service like AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), or even localhost services running on the same host as HCL Connections. This capability transforms a relatively low-impact initial compromise into a high-severity breach of confidentiality and integrity across the broader infrastructure.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must implement strict input validation mechanisms that enforce allow-listing for all outbound requests initiated by the application. It is essential to restrict allowed protocols to only those strictly necessary, such as HTTP and HTTPS, while blocking dangerous schemes like file or gopher. Furthermore, network-level controls should be deployed to prevent internal servers from accessing sensitive metadata endpoints and administrative interfaces unless explicitly required for business operations. Implementing egress filtering rules that block requests to private IP ranges, except for specific whitelisted services, provides a robust defense-in-depth strategy. Additionally, deploying web application firewalls with SSRF detection capabilities can help identify and block malicious request patterns before they reach the vulnerable component.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery as a flaw where an attacker causes the server to make requests on their behalf due to insufficient validation of user-supplied data. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this behavior corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1557, specifically Adversary-in-the-Middle or Lateral Tool Transfer scenarios where internal services are abused to move laterally and gather intelligence from adjacent systems. The exploitation path also touches upon CWE-20 Improper Input Validation, highlighting the fundamental failure in sanitizing external data before processing it within a privileged context. Addressing these issues requires both immediate patching of affected versions and long-term architectural reviews to ensure that server-side functionalities do not inadvertently expose internal network topology or sensitive configuration details to potential attackers.