CVE-2026-99693 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure
A migration MLE has a base reference for the mastering answer and an in-use reference held by dlm_migrate_lockres(). The finishing assertion consumes the base reference, but migration failure drops it again without checking whether the assertion already consumed it.
The target queues its migration worker before it acknowledges the ALL_DONE packet, so its finishing assertion can be handled while the sender still waits for the status. If the connection fails before the status arrives, dlm_send_one_lockres() returns an error for a migration that the target has already completed:
Old-master sender Finishing assertion ----------------- ------------------- publish MLE; take in-use reference send ALL_DONE; wait for status take lookup reference unlink MLE put lookup and base references send returns a connection error put base reference again; free MLE put in-use reference; access freed MLE
dlm_assert_master_handler() holds dlm->spinlock from the MLE lookup to the final puts, and it takes dlm->master_lock around the unlink and the puts. Decide under the same locks: if the MLE is already unhashed, the assertion consumed the base reference, so drop only the sender's in-use reference. Otherwise unlink it before consuming the base reference so a later assertion no longer finds it.
An assertion that got there first has also made the target the owner and cleared DLM_LOCK_RES_MIGRATING. Treating the attempt as failed at that point would leave the lockres owned by the target while this node still holds the other nodes' locks and refmap bits, so it could neither be purged nor migrated again. Finish our side as a completed migration does instead: drop those locks under res->spinlock if the target still owns the lockres, and recalculate its usage.
Use the same cleanup for the pre-send failure, the send failure and the target-death failure paths. The sender's in-use reference keeps the MLE alive until its final put outside the nested locks. Successful migration retains its existing in-use-only put.
A target that has died cannot assert after the sender has seen its death. The o2net node-down callback runs before the DLM one; it disconnects the node and flushes the workqueue that runs the message handlers, so an assertion already received has been handled by the time the DLM removes the node from the domain map. A node that leaves the domain cleanly sends its exit message only after its assertions have been answered.
Two windows of the hand-over itself are left as they are: the handler switches the owner and the sender drops the other nodes' locks moments later, and an assertion from a live target that arrives after the sender has given up still meets the owner check in the handler. Waiting for the target before giving up would only stretch the first window into the time in which recovery of the target can observe it.
KASAN report, only the relevant frames are kept:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881190e3c20 by task umount/593
Call Trace: <TASK> dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x16af/0x20d0 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110 ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0 ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440 ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940 generic_shutdown_super+0x15f/0x490 kill_block_super+0x40/0xa0 deactivate_locked_super+0xae/0x120 deactivate_super+0xa2/0xc0 cleanup_mnt+0x217/0x450 task_work_run+0x144/0x230 </TASK>
Allocated by task 593: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x20b/0x5c0 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x20e/0x20d0 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/ ---truncated---
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The Linux kernel vulnerability identified in the OCFS2 Distributed Lock Manager (DLM) subsystem represents a critical use-after-free condition arising from improper reference counting and race conditions during lock resource migration. This flaw specifically affects the handling of Migration Lock Entry structures when a distributed locking operation fails or encounters network connectivity issues between cluster nodes. The core technical issue stems from a lack of synchronization between the sender node, which initiates the migration, and the target node, which is intended to become the new master for the lock resource. During a successful migration, the process involves complex state transitions where references are taken and released in a specific order to ensure data integrity. However, when the migration fails due to connection errors or target unavailability, the sender attempts to clean up its local resources by dropping reference counts that may have already been consumed by finishing assertions on the target side. This double-free scenario leads to memory corruption because the same kernel slab object is freed multiple times concurrently.
The operational mechanics of this vulnerability involve a race condition between two distinct execution paths: one managed by the sender node and another by the target node. The sender queues a migration worker before acknowledging completion, while the target processes finishing assertions that consume base references to Migration Lock Entries. If the network connection fails before the status packet arrives back at the sender, the sender receives an error but is unaware that the target has already processed the assertion and freed its local copy of the entry. Consequently, when the sender proceeds with its cleanup routine, it attempts to release a reference count for an object that no longer exists in memory or has been reallocated for other purposes. This results in a slab-use-after-free error, as evidenced by Kernel Address Sanitizer reports showing invalid reads at addresses associated with freed kernel objects during unmount and cluster disconnection sequences.
From a security perspective, this vulnerability falls under CWE-416: Use After Free, which is particularly dangerous because it can lead to arbitrary code execution if an attacker can control the data written into the reused memory location before it is accessed again. In the context of distributed file systems like OCFS2, such vulnerabilities compromise the stability and availability of cluster services. An adversary with local access or those capable of inducing network partitions could potentially trigger this race condition by forcing rapid node disconnections during lock operations. The impact includes kernel panics leading to denial of service for all nodes in the cluster, as well as potential privilege escalation if the memory corruption allows overwriting critical kernel structures. This aligns with ATT&CK techniques related to resource hijacking and exploitation of software vulnerabilities within operating system components.
The resolution implemented by the Linux kernel maintainers focuses on serializing the cleanup process through proper locking mechanisms rather than relying solely on reference counting assumptions that fail under failure conditions. The fix ensures that if a Migration Lock Entry is already unhashed, indicating it has been processed by the target node's finishing assertion, the sender only drops its in-use reference without attempting to free the base structure again. This logic is applied consistently across pre-send failures, send failures, and target-death scenarios. Additionally, the patch addresses state consistency issues where a lock resource might be left in an inconsistent ownership state if treated as failed after the target has already assumed control. By correctly handling these edge cases under appropriate spinlocks, the kernel prevents both double frees and logical inconsistencies that could prevent proper purging or re-migration of locks.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability primarily involve applying the latest available kernel patches to systems running OCFS2 clusters. Administrators should ensure their cluster nodes are updated with versions containing fixes for dlm_migrate_lockres reference counting issues. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, reducing the frequency of rapid node restarts or network fluctuations during heavy lock contention periods can help minimize exposure windows. Furthermore, monitoring kernel logs for KASAN reports or unexpected unmount failures provides early detection indicators that this race condition may be occurring. Long-term resilience requires maintaining up-to-date cluster management tools and ensuring robust network connectivity to prevent the partition scenarios that trigger these complex state machine transitions in the distributed lock manager.