CVE-2026-103956 in Loom
Summary
by MITRE • 10/02/2026
Missing authentication for critical function in the authentication dependency in Loom for AWS before 1.6.1 allowed remote actors to obtain super-admin authority over the agent control plane, including registering tool servers, reading stored integration credentials, and rewriting the IAM role policies attached to managed agent roles, via any request to the application API in a deployment where no identity provider is configured.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.6.1 or later.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/02/2026
The vulnerability identified as missing authentication for critical functions within the Loom for AWS dependency prior to version 1.6.1 represents a severe security flaw that fundamentally undermines the integrity of the agent control plane. This issue arises specifically in deployment configurations where no external identity provider is configured, leaving the application API without proper access controls for sensitive operations. In such environments, any remote actor capable of reaching the application endpoint can exploit this lack of authentication to gain super-admin authority over the entire system. The absence of an identity provider typically implies that the default or internal authentication mechanisms were either not enforced or improperly implemented, allowing unauthenticated requests to bypass security checks entirely. This scenario highlights a critical failure in implementing secure defaults and ensuring that all administrative endpoints require valid credentials regardless of the deployment configuration.
The technical flaw allows attackers to perform high-privilege actions that should be strictly restricted to authorized administrators. Specifically, an attacker can register arbitrary tool servers within the control plane, effectively injecting malicious components into the operational workflow. Furthermore, the vulnerability permits the reading of stored integration credentials, which may include API keys, secret tokens, or other sensitive authentication material used by various services integrated with Loom for AWS. This exposure compromises the confidentiality of these secrets and can lead to further lateral movement if those credentials are reused across different systems. Additionally, attackers can rewrite IAM role policies attached to managed agent roles. By modifying these policies, an attacker can escalate privileges within the AWS environment, potentially granting themselves or their infrastructure access to sensitive resources such as S3 buckets, Lambda functions, or EC2 instances that were not originally intended for public or unauthenticated access.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is profound and extends beyond the immediate compromise of the Loom application itself. Since IAM role policies are modified, the attacker gains persistent control over cloud infrastructure managed by these roles. This can result in data exfiltration, unauthorized computation costs through resource abuse, or complete takeover of associated AWS accounts if the compromised roles have broad permissions. The ability to register tool servers also introduces a risk of supply chain compromise within the automation pipeline, as malicious tools could execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-306, which describes missing authentication for critical function, and CWE-287, involving improper authentication mechanisms. In terms of attack tactics, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1098, specifically the account manipulation sub-techniques where attackers alter permissions or add credentials to maintain access, and potentially T1556 for modifying identity provider settings if applicable in broader contexts.
To remediate this critical issue, organizations must upgrade Loom for AWS to version 1.6.1 or later immediately. This update addresses the underlying authentication logic errors that allowed unauthenticated access to administrative endpoints. In addition to upgrading, it is strongly recommended to enforce strict identity provider configurations and avoid relying on default settings in production environments. Implementing multi-factor authentication and regular audits of IAM policies can further mitigate risks associated with privilege escalation. Security teams should also review logs for any signs of unauthorized tool server registrations or credential access during the window when the vulnerability was present, as attackers may have already exploited this flaw to establish persistent backdoors within the cloud infrastructure.