CVE-2026-97212 in monta.app
Summary
by MITRE • 10/03/2026
The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.
If you want to get the best quality for vulnerability data then you always have to consider VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/03/2026
The identified vulnerability resides within the WebSocket communication layer of a charging station management system, specifically concerning how session identifiers are generated and validated during connection establishment. The core technical flaw is an implementation error in the session ID generation mechanism which relies on predictable inputs derived from charging station identifiers rather than cryptographically secure random sources or unique server-side state tracking. This design choice results in deterministic session tokens that can be anticipated by external actors who possess knowledge of the physical infrastructure layout or standard naming conventions used for the stations. Because the backend system accepts multiple concurrent WebSocket connections associated with a single, predictable session identifier, it fails to enforce strict one-to-one mapping between a specific client endpoint and its authorized session context. This lack of binding allows an attacker to hijack existing sessions by connecting from their own endpoint using the same predicted identifier as a legitimate user or administrative process.
From a security architecture perspective, this flaw represents a classic case of insecure direct object references combined with insufficient entropy in session management. The predictability of the identifiers undermines the fundamental assumption that a session token serves as an unguessable secret capable of authenticating identity and authorizing actions within the application context. By allowing multiple endpoints to utilize the same identifier simultaneously, the system inadvertently creates a race condition environment where state conflicts can occur, or more critically, enables session hijacking without requiring complex exploitation techniques such as cross-site scripting or network sniffing if the WebSocket traffic is not properly encrypted via WSS with strong certificate validation. The vulnerability effectively bypasses authentication controls by allowing an attacker to impersonate any user associated with a known charging station identifier simply by initiating a connection using that predicted ID.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, encompassing both unauthorized access and service disruption potential. An authenticated malicious actor can leverage the predictable session IDs to authenticate as other users, potentially gaining access to sensitive personal data, billing information, or control over electric vehicle charging processes. This could lead to financial fraud through manipulation of charging sessions or theft of electricity services if the system allows free usage under certain conditions. Furthermore, the ability to connect multiple endpoints using valid session identifiers facilitates denial-of-service attacks against specific users or administrative accounts. By flooding the backend with numerous connections tied to a single target identifier, an attacker can exhaust server resources such as memory and connection slots associated with that session, effectively locking out legitimate users from their charging stations or management interfaces.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-384 Session Fixation and CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration, though the primary classification is often categorized under CWE-290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing due to the predictability of the credentials used for session establishment. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this behavior maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1588.003 Obtain Defacement Tools or more accurately T1078 Valid Accounts when considering the hijacking aspect, and T1496 Resource Hijacking if utilized for denial-of-service purposes through resource exhaustion via multiple connections. The lack of unique session binding per endpoint is a critical deviation from secure coding practices recommended by OWASP for WebSocket implementations, which emphasize strict origin validation and random token generation to prevent such associations.
Mitigation strategies must focus on eliminating predictability and enforcing strict one-to-one mapping between sessions and endpoints. Developers should replace the current identifier generation logic with cryptographically strong pseudo-random number generators that produce high-entropy session IDs unique to each connection attempt. It is essential to implement server-side state management where a specific WebSocket upgrade request is bound exclusively to the originating IP address, port, and user context, rejecting any subsequent attempts to connect using an already active or reserved identifier from different endpoints unless explicitly authorized through proper re-authentication flows. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on new connection requests per session ID can mitigate denial-of-service risks by preventing a single actor from overwhelming the backend with multiple connections under one predicted token. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on WebSocket implementation details are recommended to ensure that future updates do not reintroduce similar weaknesses in identity management protocols.