CVE-2026-95102 in monta.app
Summary
by MITRE • 10/03/2026
WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to impersonate charging stations. As a result, attackers can exploit this weakness to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or perform unauthorized actions. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation and potentially compromise the security of the entire system.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/03/2026
The identified vulnerability centers on a critical absence of authentication controls within WebSocket endpoints used for communication with charging stations in electric vehicle infrastructure systems. This architectural flaw allows any network-accessible entity to establish a persistent, bidirectional connection without verifying identity or permissions. In modern IoT and industrial control environments, such as EV charging networks, real-time data exchange is essential for monitoring status, managing power distribution, and processing payment transactions. The lack of mandatory authentication mechanisms means that the system fails to enforce access control policies at the transport layer, effectively treating all incoming connections from untrusted sources with the same level of trust as legitimate administrative or operational clients. This represents a fundamental failure in implementing secure communication protocols where identity verification is required before any sensitive operations are permitted.
From a technical perspective, this weakness aligns directly with CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The WebSocket protocol itself provides the transport mechanism but does not inherently enforce application-level security; therefore, it relies on the implementing server to validate credentials during the initial HTTP handshake or through subsequent message-based authentication tokens. In this specific instance, the implementation omits these checks entirely. Consequently, an attacker can exploit this by initiating a direct connection from any location within network reachability scope. Once connected, the attacker gains the ability to send commands and receive responses as if they were an authorized charging station operator or system administrator. This bypasses standard security boundaries that would otherwise restrict access based on user roles, device certificates, or API keys, creating a significant gap in the defense-in-depth strategy of the infrastructure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the high-value nature of the data and control functions involved. Unauthorized actors can exploit this open channel to exfiltrate sensitive information such as individual charging session logs, user payment details, location history, and vehicle identification numbers. Beyond data theft, the ability to impersonate a legitimate station allows for malicious actions including unauthorized firmware updates, manipulation of power output settings, or complete denial of service by disabling specific chargers. This can lead to financial fraud through manipulated transaction records and physical risks if charging parameters are altered incorrectly. Furthermore, because WebSocket connections often remain open for extended periods, an attacker maintains persistent access without needing to re-authenticate, facilitating long-term espionage or sabotage operations that are difficult to detect using traditional perimeter security tools designed for stateless HTTP requests.
This vulnerability also facilitates privilege escalation within the broader ecosystem. By impersonating a charging station, an attacker may gain insights into internal network topologies and interact with backend management systems that trust these endpoints implicitly. This can serve as a pivot point for lateral movement toward more critical infrastructure components such as billing servers or grid integration modules. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that WebSocket traffic often traverses firewalls and proxies on standard web ports, making it difficult to distinguish from legitimate application traffic without deep packet inspection capabilities specifically configured to validate authentication headers in real-time streams.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation efforts must focus on implementing robust authentication mechanisms for all WebSocket connections. This includes requiring valid OAuth 2.0 tokens, JWTs, or mutual TLS certificates during the initial handshake phase before upgrading from HTTP to WebSocket protocol. Access control lists should be enforced at the application layer to ensure that only authorized entities can perform specific actions based on their assigned roles. Additionally, implementing rate limiting and anomaly detection for connection attempts can help identify and block brute-force attacks against authentication endpoints. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on API and real-time communication channels are essential to verify that these controls remain effective as the system evolves. Adhering to industry standards such as OWASP API Security Top 10, particularly regarding broken object level authorization and insufficient input validation, will help prevent similar vulnerabilities in future development cycles.