CVE-2026-116280 in Kameleo
Summary
by MITRE • 10/26/2026
A vulnerability was determined in Kameleo up to 5.0.1.26. Affected is the function InternalController.TestProxy of the file client-engine-application/f.cs of the component Proxy Validation. Executing a manipulation of the argument host/port can lead to server-side request forgery. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 5.2.0 is able to address this issue. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component. The route has been removed and replaced with /general/test-proxy in 5.2.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/26/2026
The vulnerability identified in Kameleo versions up through 5.0.1.26 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw located within the Proxy Validation component. Specifically, the defect resides in the InternalController.TestProxy function found in the client-engine-application/f.cs file. This architectural weakness allows an attacker to manipulate input arguments related to host and port parameters, which are processed by the application without sufficient validation or sanitization. By injecting maliciously crafted values into these fields, a remote adversary can compel the vulnerable server to initiate HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations under its own identity. This capability fundamentally undermines the integrity of the system's network operations, as the server becomes an unwitting proxy for external attacks against internal resources or third-party services that trust connections originating from the victim host.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The core issue stems from the application's failure to enforce strict allow-listing of permitted destinations for proxy validation requests. When the InternalController.TestProxy function accepts user-supplied host and port data, it directly incorporates these values into outgoing network calls without verifying whether the target address is internal, local, or otherwise unauthorized. This lack of input control enables a remote attacker to exploit the vulnerability by sending specially crafted HTTP requests that redirect the server's traffic toward sensitive endpoints such as cloud metadata services, internal database interfaces, or other backend systems not intended for public access. The ability to launch this attack remotely significantly increases its severity, as it does not require local authentication or physical proximity to the target system.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exfiltration from the immediate server. Because Kameleo is often used in environments involving automated browsing and proxy management, an SSRF exploit could facilitate broader network reconnaissance by mapping internal topologies through error-based responses or timing differences. Furthermore, if the compromised service has access to sensitive credentials stored within its environment variables or configuration files, those secrets could be exfiltrated via out-of-band channels initiated by the forged requests. In enterprise deployments where Kameleo integrates with other security tools or monitoring systems, this vulnerability could serve as a pivot point for lateral movement, allowing attackers to bypass perimeter defenses and establish persistence within the internal network infrastructure.
To mitigate this risk, immediate action is required to upgrade the affected component to version 5.2.0 or later. The vendor has addressed the issue by removing the vulnerable route entirely and replacing it with /general/test-proxy in the updated release. This structural change likely involves implementing stricter input validation mechanisms that restrict proxy test requests to a predefined list of safe domains or IP ranges, thereby preventing arbitrary destination manipulation. Organizations relying on Kameleo should prioritize this upgrade as part of their patch management cycle. Additionally, until the update is applied, network-level controls such as firewall rules restricting outbound connections from the application server can provide temporary mitigation by blocking access to internal subnets and cloud metadata endpoints. Continuous monitoring for unusual outbound traffic patterns originating from the proxy validation service may also aid in detecting potential exploitation attempts before significant damage occurs.