CVE-2026-77054 in boneIO
Summary
by MITRE • 10/26/2026
boneIO Black stores passwords, including the MQTT broker and web panel passwords, in cleartext. The GET /api/config endpoint returns the full configuration with sub-services passwords exposed. Any authenticated user can call the endpoint and access the administrative passwords in cleartext form. Critically, due to CVE-2026-77053 (authentication disabled by default), an unauthenticated attacker on the same local network can retrieve all passwords.
This issue was fixed in version 1.6.0: web panel passwords are stored as salted scrypt hashes in a file readable only by the service account, and the API and logs no longer return secret values. The MQTT broker password has to stay recoverable because the application presents it to the broker as a client; it is kept in a separate file readable only by the service account and is no longer exposed through the API.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/26/2026
The vulnerability identified involves boneIO Black devices storing sensitive credentials, including those for the MQTT broker and web panel authentication, in plaintext within configuration files or memory structures that are accessible to application processes without adequate protection mechanisms. This architectural flaw allows any authenticated user with access to the device's API interface to retrieve full system configurations via the GET /api/config endpoint, which inadvertently exposes administrative passwords in their original cleartext form. The severity of this issue is significantly amplified by a related configuration defect where authentication is disabled by default on certain network interfaces or endpoints, as referenced in CVE-2026-77053. This combination creates a scenario where an unauthenticated attacker positioned on the same local area network can exploit the lack of access controls to query the API and extract all stored credentials without needing valid login tokens or session identifiers.
From a technical perspective, this represents a classic case of improper credential storage combined with insufficient authentication enforcement. The exposure occurs because the application logic does not filter sensitive fields from configuration responses sent over HTTP APIs, violating fundamental principles of secure data handling. By returning plaintext passwords in API responses, the system fails to implement basic security controls that would prevent information leakage through standard web service interactions. This behavior aligns directly with CWE-256, which covers the storage of passwords in a recoverable format, and CWE-798, regarding the use of hardcoded default credentials or insufficiently protected credential stores. The lack of encryption for stored secrets means that once an attacker gains network-level access to the device's management interface, they can immediately obtain full administrative control over both the web panel and the MQTT messaging infrastructure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it compromises the confidentiality and integrity of the entire IoT deployment. An adversary who obtains these credentials can impersonate legitimate users on the web administration interface, potentially modifying device settings, disabling security features, or installing malicious firmware updates. Furthermore, access to the MQTT broker password allows an attacker to intercept, modify, or inject messages into the communication stream between boneIO devices and backend servers. This could lead to unauthorized control of connected IoT endpoints, data exfiltration from sensors or actuators, and disruption of critical services that rely on real-time messaging. In environments where these devices manage physical infrastructure such as lighting, HVAC systems, or security cameras, this level of access poses significant risks to both digital privacy and physical safety.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the vendor released version 1.6.0 which implements several corrective measures aligned with industry best practices for secure credential management. First, web panel passwords are now stored using salted scrypt hashes rather than plaintext, ensuring that even if configuration files are accessed, the actual passwords cannot be easily recovered without significant computational effort. These hashed credentials are stored in a file with restricted permissions, readable only by the specific service account running the application, thereby limiting exposure to other processes or users on the system. Second, the API and logging mechanisms have been updated to exclude secret values from responses and output streams, preventing accidental leakage through standard operational channels. For the MQTT broker password, which must remain recoverable for client authentication purposes, the implementation isolates this credential in a separate file with strict access controls, ensuring it is not exposed via the general configuration API endpoint.
Organizations deploying boneIO Black devices should immediately upgrade to version 1.6.0 or later to address these security deficiencies. Additionally, administrators should verify that network segmentation policies are enforced to restrict access to management interfaces from untrusted networks, mitigating risks associated with default authentication settings. Regular audits of configuration files and API responses can help detect any residual exposure of sensitive data. Adhering to the principle of least privilege ensures that only authorized processes have read access to credential stores, while implementing robust encryption for secrets at rest provides defense-in-depth against potential file system compromises. These steps collectively reduce the attack surface and align the device's security posture with established standards such as OWASP IoT Top Ten guidelines regarding insecure data storage and broken authentication mechanisms.