CVE-2026-120442 in ape-volo-admin
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
ape-volo-admin before 3.6.1 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to forge administrator tokens using a hardcoded JWT signing key in appsettings.json. Attackers can sign tokens offline with the jti claim set to the seeded administrator id to gain full API control over users, roles, permissions and data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The ape-volo-admin framework prior to version 3.6.1 suffers from a critical authentication bypass vulnerability rooted in improper handling of JSON Web Token signing keys within its configuration files. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to forge valid administrator tokens by exploiting a hardcoded secret key stored directly in the appsettings.json file. By leveraging this static credential, an attacker can independently generate signed JWTs without any interaction with the application's authentication server or access to live credentials. The vulnerability stems from the failure to rotate signing keys dynamically or store them securely using environment variables or dedicated secrets management systems, thereby exposing a fundamental weakness in identity and access control mechanisms that are central to modern web applications.
From a technical perspective, the exploitation involves constructing a JWT with specific claims that trick the application into treating the forged token as an authentic administrative session. Specifically, attackers set the jti claim to match the seeded administrator identifier known within the system's database schema. When this maliciously signed token is presented to the API endpoints protected by role-based access controls, the server validates the signature using the exposed hardcoded key and accepts it as legitimate due to the matching user context implied by the jti value. This effectively bypasses all standard authentication checks, granting the attacker full administrative privileges over the application's core functionalities including user management, role assignment, permission configuration, and data manipulation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, resulting in a complete compromise of system integrity and confidentiality. An adversary with network access to the affected service can assume the identity of an administrator without detection through traditional login monitoring alone. This leads to unauthorized modification or deletion of critical business data, creation of backdoor accounts for persistent access, and potential lateral movement within connected infrastructure if administrative credentials are reused elsewhere. The ability to manipulate roles and permissions further exacerbates the risk by allowing the attacker to escalate privileges across multiple user tiers or disable security logging mechanisms that might otherwise reveal their presence.
This incident aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, as it involves the use of a static password-like value in source code or configuration files rather than dynamic secrets management. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically under the sub-category of Default Accounts when leveraging seeded identifiers, and potentially T1528: Steal Application Access Token if the forged token is used for subsequent API abuse. The vulnerability highlights the importance of adhering to secure coding practices that mandate externalized configuration management and regular key rotation protocols.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately update ape-volo-admin to version 3.6.1 or later where these issues have been addressed by removing hardcoded secrets from default configurations. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should replace the static signing key with a strong, randomly generated secret stored securely in environment variables or a vault solution like HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager. Additionally, implementing multi-factor authentication for administrative accounts and monitoring for anomalous JWT validation patterns can provide additional layers of defense against exploitation attempts while remediation efforts are underway.