CVE-2026-59012 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
In checkLastKnownCellIdAccessPermission of TelephonyPermissions.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The vulnerability identified in the Android telephony subsystem specifically within the CheckLastKnownCellIdAccessPermission function of TelephonyPermissions.java represents a critical failure in access control enforcement mechanisms. This flaw stems from an omission where the system fails to verify whether the requesting application possesses the necessary permissions before granting access to sensitive location data derived from cellular network information. In modern mobile operating systems, particularly Android, the protection of user privacy relies heavily on strict permission boundaries that separate privileged system services from third-party applications. When these checks are bypassed due to missing code logic or improper conditional statements, it creates a direct pathway for unauthorized entities to retrieve sensitive state information without adhering to standard security protocols.
From a technical perspective, this issue is classified under CWE-284 Improper Access Control and more specifically aligns with CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The function responsible for validating access permissions does not adequately check if the caller has been granted the READ_PHONE_STATE or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission as required by the platform's security model. Consequently, any application installed on the device can invoke this internal method to retrieve the last known cell ID associated with the device's current network connection. This bypass is particularly dangerous because it operates at a low level within the telephony stack, allowing data extraction before higher-level privacy filters or user consent dialogs are triggered. The absence of these checks means that the security boundary intended by the operating system developers is effectively nullified for this specific API endpoint.
The operational impact of this vulnerability centers on local information disclosure with significant implications for user privacy and location tracking. Cell ID data, while less precise than GPS coordinates, can still be used to triangulate a device's approximate physical location when combined with other available network data or historical records. An attacker exploiting this flaw does not need elevated privileges such as root access, nor do they require any form of user interaction like clicking through prompts or granting permissions via the UI. The exploitation is silent and automatic, meaning that once an malicious application is installed on a victim's device, it can continuously harvest location data in the background without the user's knowledge. This capability facilitates persistent surveillance and profiling, violating core privacy expectations established by both users and regulatory frameworks such as GDPR or CCPA which mandate explicit consent for location tracking.
This vulnerability maps directly to several techniques within the MITRE ATT&CK framework for mobile platforms. It aligns with T1530 Data from Local System, where an adversary retrieves data stored on a compromised device without executing additional code beyond what is already present in the malicious app. Furthermore, it relates to T1421 Location Tracking, as the primary objective of accessing cell ID information is often to determine the physical whereabouts of the target. The lack of user interaction required for exploitation places this threat in the category of stealthy persistence and data exfiltration methods that are difficult for users or even basic security monitoring tools to detect immediately.
Mitigation strategies must focus on reinforcing the permission verification logic within the TelephonyPermissions.java file. Developers should ensure that every call to retrieve sensitive telephony state information is preceded by a rigorous check using Context.checkCallingOrSelfPermission, ensuring that both READ_PHONE_STATE and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions are explicitly verified before returning any data. Additionally, implementing strict logging for access attempts can aid in future audits and detection of anomalous behavior. For end-users, the primary defense remains keeping device operating systems updated to versions where this patch has been applied by the vendor. Security researchers should also advocate for stricter enforcement of least-privilege principles across all telephony APIs to prevent similar bypasses in other sensitive data retrieval functions within the Android framework.