CVE-2026-123799 in SuperTokens
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
SuperTokens Core is an open source authentication server. From 11.0.0 until 11.0.9, 11.1.4, 11.2.4, 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, and 12.1.2, Dashboard.isValidUserSession treats any stored session row as valid without comparing DashboardSessionInfo.expiry to the current time. DashboardQueries.getSessionInfoWithSessionId also selects by app and session identifier without an expiry predicate, leaving the periodic DeleteExpiredDashboardSessions cleanup as the only expiration enforcement. An attacker who obtains a dashboard administrator session after its 30-day lifetime can continue using POST /recipe/dashboard/session/verify until the row is removed, and frequent Core restarts can prevent the 12-hour cleanup sweep from running. The stale session retains full dashboard read and write access, but the flaw does not provide a way to guess or acquire the random session identifier. This issue is fixed in versions 11.0.9, 11.1.4, 11.2.4, 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, and 12.1.2.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
SuperTokens Core is an open-source authentication server designed to manage user identities and sessions for web applications. A critical security flaw was identified in the dashboard session management logic within specific versions of this software, ranging from early releases up through version 12.1.2. The vulnerability stems from a failure to enforce time-based expiration checks during the validation process for administrative dashboard sessions. Specifically, the function responsible for verifying user sessions, Dashboard.isValidUserSession, operates under the assumption that any session row present in the database is valid. It fails to compare the stored session's expiry timestamp against the current system time before granting access. This oversight means that the temporal validity of a session token is ignored during the verification step, relying entirely on external cleanup mechanisms rather than immediate cryptographic or logical validation at the point of use.
The technical root cause lies in two primary areas within the dashboard query logic. First, as noted above, the isValidUserSession method does not check for expiration dates. Second, the helper function DashboardQueries.getSessionInfoWithSessionId retrieves session information based solely on application identifier and session ID without applying an expiry predicate to filter out stale records. This design decision leaves the system dependent on a periodic background task, DeleteExpiredDashboardSessions, which is scheduled to run every twelve hours to remove expired entries from the database. Consequently, if this cleanup job fails to execute or is delayed due to server restarts or high load, sessions that have technically expired remain active and accessible within the application state until they are physically deleted from storage.
The operational impact of this vulnerability allows an attacker who has obtained a dashboard administrator session token after its thirty-day lifetime to maintain unauthorized access to the SuperTokens Dashboard. The attacker can continue to use the POST /recipe/dashboard/session/verify endpoint, which is typically used by clients to check if their current session is still valid before making authenticated requests. Because this verification step does not reject expired sessions, the attacker retains full read and write privileges associated with an administrator account indefinitely, or until a successful cleanup sweep occurs. This persistence of access poses significant risks including data exfiltration, configuration tampering, and potential lateral movement within environments where SuperTokens manages critical identity infrastructure.
It is important to note that this vulnerability does not provide a mechanism for session prediction or acquisition. The session identifiers used are cryptographically random, making it infeasible for an attacker to guess valid session IDs without prior compromise of the token itself. Therefore, exploitation requires initial access through other means such as credential theft, phishing, or interception of unencrypted traffic if TLS is not properly configured. However, once a stale admin session ID is obtained from logs, backups, or memory dumps after its expiration date, it can be used to bypass intended security controls regarding session duration limits.
This flaw aligns with CWE-613, which describes Insufficient Session Expiration, as the application fails to properly invalidate sessions when they are no longer valid due to time constraints. From a tactical perspective related to MITRE ATT&CK, this vulnerability facilitates Persistence by allowing an adversary to maintain access using previously compromised credentials or tokens that should have been revoked automatically. It also relates to Defense Evasion techniques where attackers leverage expired but still accepted session tokens to bypass authentication checks designed to limit the window of opportunity for unauthorized actions.
Mitigation strategies primarily involve upgrading SuperTokens Core to patched versions, specifically 11.0.9 and later minor releases up through 12.1.2, which correct the validation logic to include expiry checks during session verification. In environments where immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should ensure that the periodic cleanup job runs reliably by monitoring server health and avoiding unnecessary restarts that might delay or skip the twelve-hour sweep window. Additionally, implementing strict TLS enforcement ensures that session tokens are protected in transit, reducing the likelihood of initial token theft. Regular auditing of active sessions and reviewing database records for expired entries can also help identify potential abuse windows before they lead to significant security incidents.