CVE-2026-118795 in Infantia
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
Administrative roles and module permissions are stored in mutable local database fields, allowing privilege escalation for attackers with database write access.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
The vulnerability described represents a critical flaw in the security architecture of applications that rely on mutable local databases to store administrative roles and module permissions. In secure system design, authorization data such as user privileges, role assignments, and feature access rights must be treated as highly sensitive configuration parameters that are resistant to unauthorized modification. When these attributes are stored directly within a writable database table without sufficient integrity checks or immutable constraints, the application fails to enforce the principle of least privilege effectively. This architectural decision creates a direct pathway for attackers who have achieved write access to any part of the underlying data store to manipulate their own permission levels arbitrarily.
From a technical perspective, this flaw constitutes an authorization bypass where the system trusts client-side or database-level inputs without validating them against a trusted source of truth. The absence of server-side validation means that if an attacker can inject SQL commands, exploit a separate injection vulnerability, or otherwise gain write privileges to the specific tables containing role definitions, they can directly alter their user record to include administrative flags or grant themselves access to restricted modules. This type of issue is fundamentally rooted in improper privilege management and insufficient separation between data storage and security policy enforcement mechanisms.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it effectively nullifies all other authentication and authorization controls within the application. Once an attacker escalates their privileges by modifying these database fields, they gain full administrative control over the system. This allows for complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The attacker can exfiltrate sensitive data from other users, modify or delete critical records, install backdoors, and potentially pivot to attack internal network resources depending on the application's connectivity. Because the modification occurs at the database level, it may bypass application-level logging mechanisms if those logs are not strictly tied to immutable audit trails that record changes to security-critical fields.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management and CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource in the Common Weakness Enumeration taxonomy. It also maps closely to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, specifically the sub-technique of privilege escalation through account manipulation or configuration changes. The attack vector leverages existing database access rather than exploiting a traditional software bug, highlighting that security must extend beyond code vulnerabilities into data governance and infrastructure hardening practices.
To mitigate this risk, organizations should implement strict role-based access control models where permissions are derived from immutable configurations stored outside the mutable application database whenever possible. If local storage is necessary for performance or offline capabilities, these fields must be protected using cryptographic signing to detect tampering rather than relying solely on write restrictions which can often be bypassed by privileged users or compromised services. Additionally, implementing comprehensive audit logging that records all changes to security-related attributes and triggering immediate alerts upon detection of unauthorized modifications can help in early threat detection. Regular database integrity checks and the use of read-only replicas for application logic where feasible further reduce the attack surface associated with mutable privilege stores.