CVE-2026-118460 in Infantia
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
Embedded private keys protected by a shared password can be used to sign practitioner assertions for arbitrary practitioner identifiers, enabling unauthorized practitioner token requests.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
The vulnerability described involves the improper handling of cryptographic material within an embedded system or application context, specifically concerning the protection and usage of private keys associated with digital signatures. In secure systems that utilize Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for identity verification, such as those adhering to healthcare interoperability standards like HL7 FHIR, practitioners are often required to sign assertions to prove their identity when requesting access tokens or performing authenticated operations. These private keys must be protected against unauthorized extraction and misuse. The core technical flaw lies in the reliance on a shared password to protect embedded private keys. This approach introduces significant risks because shared passwords are inherently difficult to manage securely at scale, prone to leakage through insecure storage practices, social engineering, or insider threats. Furthermore, if the implementation fails to enforce strict access controls or proper key derivation mechanisms, an attacker who gains read access to the system memory or configuration files may extract the private key and its associated password.
Once the embedded private keys are compromised, the security model collapses because the cryptographic proof of identity is no longer tied exclusively to a specific, authorized entity. An adversary can utilize these stolen credentials to sign practitioner assertions for arbitrary practitioner identifiers rather than their own legitimate identity. This capability allows the attacker to impersonate any registered practitioner within the system by generating valid digital signatures that appear authentic to the verification service. The operational impact of this flaw is severe, as it enables unauthorized practitioner token requests. By presenting a forged assertion signed with a stolen key but claiming a different practitioner's identity, an attacker can obtain access tokens intended for other users. This leads directly to privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive patient data or system functions that are restricted based on role-based access control policies tied to specific practitioners.
From a standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-321, which describes the use of a hard-coded cryptographic key, as well as CWE-798, concerning the use of hardcoded credentials. The failure to properly protect private keys in storage or memory reflects weaknesses identified in CWE-359 regarding exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor. In terms of adversarial tactics, this scenario maps to techniques found in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, specifically T1078 Valid Accounts, where attackers use legitimate credentials to gain access, and potentially T1552 Unsecured Credentials if the keys are stored insecurely on disk or in configuration files. The ability to sign assertions for arbitrary identifiers also touches upon identity spoofing mechanisms often categorized under lateral movement or initial access strategies depending on how the compromised token is utilized within the broader network environment.
Mitigation requires a fundamental redesign of the key management strategy rather than relying solely on password protection for embedded keys. Best practices dictate that private keys should never be stored in plaintext or protected only by weak, shared passwords if they are accessible to multiple users or processes. Instead, systems should leverage hardware security modules (HSMs) or trusted platform modules (TPMs) to isolate and protect cryptographic operations from the main operating system environment. If software-based storage is unavoidable, keys must be encrypted using strong, unique per-user key derivation functions with salts, ensuring that compromise of one credential does not expose all others. Additionally, implementing certificate pinning and rigorous validation of practitioner identifiers during assertion verification can help detect anomalies where a signature matches a key but the claimed identity does not align with expected patterns or historical behavior. Regular audits of access logs for unusual token request patterns originating from compromised identities should also be implemented to limit the window of exploitation after any potential breach occurs.