CVE-2026-118461 in Infantia
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
The shared client accepts caller-controlled doctor identifiers for read and write operations without requiring authentication or authorization credentials.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the shared client architecture, specifically affecting operations that interact with medical data repositories identified by doctor identifiers. The core technical flaw lies in the absence of mandatory authentication and authorization checks for both read and write actions initiated through this interface. By accepting caller-controlled doctor identifiers without validating whether the requesting entity possesses legitimate credentials or sufficient privileges to access those specific records, the system exposes sensitive patient health information to unauthorized parties. This design oversight allows any external actor with network connectivity to the service endpoint to query medical histories, diagnostic results, and treatment plans associated with arbitrary physician profiles, effectively bypassing all security boundaries intended to protect protected health information under regulations such as HIPAA in the United States or GDPR in Europe.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns directly with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, and CWE-862, Missing Authorization. The vulnerability enables an attacker to perform data enumeration by iterating through valid doctor identifiers to harvest associated patient records without needing prior knowledge of user credentials or session tokens. This lack of enforcement means that the application logic trusts input parameters implicitly rather than verifying them against a central policy engine or identity provider. Consequently, the integrity and confidentiality of the medical database are severely compromised, as there is no mechanism to distinguish between legitimate administrative requests and malicious data exfiltration attempts initiated by anonymous users.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the sensitivity of the affected data. Unauthorized access to doctor-linked patient records can lead to significant privacy violations, identity theft, and potential fraud involving insurance claims or medical prescriptions. Furthermore, if write operations are also unauthenticated as described, an attacker could modify clinical notes, alter medication lists, or inject false diagnostic information into a physician's record. Such tampering poses direct risks to patient safety, potentially leading to incorrect treatments being administered by healthcare providers who rely on the integrity of these digital records. The ability to manipulate data without detection further exacerbates the risk, as it undermines trust in electronic health record systems and may result in regulatory fines, legal liability, and irreversible reputational damage for the organization hosting the service.
In terms of threat modeling, this vulnerability facilitates actions categorized under MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1078 Valid Accounts if credentials were known but misused, or more accurately T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie if session hijacking was involved, though in this specific case it is closer to T1046 Network Service Discovery combined with data exfiltration. Attackers can leverage automated tools to scan for valid doctor identifiers and extract large volumes of data rapidly. The lack of rate limiting or anomaly detection further amplifies the ease of exploitation, allowing for bulk extraction of sensitive medical records without triggering typical security alerts associated with brute-force attacks on login pages.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts must focus on implementing robust identity verification and strict access control policies. All read and write operations involving doctor identifiers should require valid authentication tokens issued by a trusted identity provider. Additionally, role-based access control or attribute-based access control mechanisms must be enforced to ensure that only authorized personnel with specific permissions can access records associated with particular doctors. Input validation alone is insufficient; the system must verify not just the format of the identifier but also the legitimacy of the requestor's right to view or modify data linked to that identifier. Implementing comprehensive audit logging for all such operations will aid in detecting and investigating any unauthorized access attempts, while network-level controls like IP whitelisting can provide an additional layer of defense if applicable to the deployment environment.