CVE-2026-118464 in Infantia
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
Shared cryptographic services use fixed vendor-wide secrets, deterministic IVs, null salts, and reversible transformations to protect credentials, IPC data, configuration values, and clinical fields.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
The described vulnerability represents a fundamental failure in the implementation of cryptographic primitives within shared service architectures, specifically affecting systems that handle sensitive operational data such as user credentials, inter-process communication payloads, system configurations, and clinical information records. This issue stems from the reliance on static or predictable security parameters rather than dynamic, unique values for each encryption operation. In modern cybersecurity frameworks, this aligns directly with CWE-327, which categorizes the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm as a critical weakness. More specifically, it reflects violations of fundamental principles outlined in NIST Special Publication 800-131A regarding key management and data protection standards, where deterministic encryption without proper randomization is considered insecure for protecting sensitive data at rest or in transit.
The core technical flaw lies in the use of fixed vendor-wide secrets combined with deterministic initialization vectors and null salts. A fixed secret implies that every instance of a particular software product deployed across different environments uses the same cryptographic key material, creating a single point of failure where compromise of one system allows an attacker to decrypt data from all other systems using the same version or configuration. Deterministic initialization vectors mean that identical plaintext inputs will always produce identical ciphertext outputs when encrypted with the same key and IV. This property destroys semantic security, allowing attackers to perform traffic analysis and pattern recognition attacks. If an adversary observes repeated messages in network traffic or database entries, they can infer relationships between data points without ever decrypting them, effectively leaking metadata about user behavior or system state.
Furthermore, the use of null salts exacerbates these issues by removing a critical layer of defense against pre-computed rainbow table attacks and brute-force efforts. Salts are intended to ensure that even if two users have identical passwords or configurations, their hashed or encrypted representations differ significantly due to unique random values added before processing. By employing null salts, the system fails to provide this uniqueness, making it trivial for attackers to use large dictionaries of common credentials or configuration strings to reverse-engineer the plaintext from the ciphertext. This is particularly dangerous in clinical fields where patient data privacy regulations like HIPAA mandate strict controls over how protected health information is stored and transmitted. The lack of proper salting means that a single cracked key can expose vast amounts of sensitive historical data simultaneously.
The operational impact of these deficiencies extends beyond simple unauthorized access to include integrity violations and systemic compromise. Because the transformations are described as reversible, it implies weak encryption algorithms or improper modes of operation such as ECB mode, which does not hide patterns in the plaintext. An attacker with read access to storage media or network packets can reconstruct sensitive configuration values that might reveal internal network topology, administrative credentials, or security policies. In inter-process communication scenarios, this allows for potential injection attacks where an adversary crafts malicious IPC messages that mimic legitimate ones because they understand the deterministic encryption scheme. This undermines trust in system components and could lead to privilege escalation if authentication tokens or session identifiers are encrypted using these flawed methods.
Mitigation requires a comprehensive overhaul of the cryptographic implementation strategy rather than simple patching. The organization must immediately replace fixed vendor-wide secrets with unique, randomly generated keys for each deployment instance, adhering to key management best practices that include regular rotation and secure storage in hardware security modules or trusted platform modules where feasible. Initialization vectors must be replaced with cryptographically secure random numbers for every encryption operation, ensuring non-determinism. Salts used for hashing credentials must be unique per user and generated using a strong pseudo-random number generator. Additionally, the reversible transformations should be evaluated against current standards to ensure they employ authenticated encryption modes such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305, which provide both confidentiality and integrity protection.
Long-term remediation involves adopting a zero-trust architecture mindset where no shared secrets are assumed safe across boundaries. Security teams should conduct thorough code audits focusing on cryptographic implementations to identify other instances of weak practices such as hardcoded keys or predictable random number generation. Compliance with industry standards like NIST SP 800-57 for key management and OWASP Cryptographic Cheat Sheet guidelines is essential to ensure that future developments do not reintroduce these vulnerabilities. Regular penetration testing should include specific scenarios targeting cryptographic weaknesses, verifying that identical inputs produce distinct outputs and that no static keys are exposed in source code or configuration files. By addressing these foundational flaws, the organization can restore confidence in its data protection mechanisms and reduce the risk of large-scale data breaches affecting credentials, configurations, and clinical records.