CVE-2026-118458 in Phronesis
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
The shared AIS login routing selects a production-shipped test DAO and plaintext comparison for the H and V application codes, accepting fixed administrator accounts.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical failure in authentication logic within an Application Information System (AIS), specifically involving the handling of administrative credentials through hardcoded or default account mechanisms. The core technical flaw lies in the routing mechanism that directs login requests to a Data Access Object (DAO) intended for testing purposes rather than production-grade validation routines. This misconfiguration allows attackers to bypass standard security controls by exploiting test-specific logic paths that remain active and accessible in live environments, effectively undermining the integrity of the authentication subsystem.
The exploitation vector relies on two distinct but related weaknesses: the use of plaintext comparison algorithms for application codes H and V, and the acceptance of fixed administrator accounts with known or easily guessable credentials. Plaintext comparisons indicate a lack of cryptographic hashing such as bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2 when storing or verifying sensitive identifiers like application codes. This means that if any part of the system leaks these values through error messages, logs, or memory dumps, they can be immediately utilized without computational overhead for cracking. Furthermore, fixed administrator accounts imply static credentials that do not rotate and are likely documented in internal manuals or discoverable via reverse engineering, providing a persistent backdoor into the system with elevated privileges.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability grants unauthorized users full administrative access to the AIS platform. An attacker can manipulate application configurations, exfiltrate sensitive data stored within the system, modify user permissions, and potentially pivot to other systems connected to or dependent on the AIS infrastructure. The presence of test DAOs in production suggests a broader issue with deployment pipelines where security testing artifacts are not properly purged before release, indicating significant gaps in both development lifecycle management and quality assurance processes. This level of access can lead to complete system compromise, data integrity violations, and regulatory non-compliance depending on the sensitivity of the handled information.
This flaw aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, as it involves fixed administrator accounts that are difficult to change or rotate securely. Additionally, the use of plaintext comparison for application codes relates to CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information if these values are transmitted over networks without encryption, and potentially CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation if weaker cryptographic standards were chosen during authentication setup. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this vulnerability facilitates the ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, where adversaries leverage legitimate credentials to maintain persistence and evade detection by appearing as authorized users within the system environment.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. First, all test-specific DAOs and routing logic intended for development or staging environments must be strictly removed from production builds through rigorous CI/CD pipeline checks that prevent non-production code paths from executing in live settings. Second, fixed administrator accounts should be eliminated entirely; instead, dynamic credential management with multi-factor authentication (MFA) and role-based access control (RBAC) should be implemented to ensure that administrative privileges are granted only when necessary and verified through robust identity proofing mechanisms. Application codes H and V must be hashed using strong, salted cryptographic algorithms before storage or comparison, ensuring that even if database contents are compromised, the original values remain unrecoverable. Finally, regular security audits and penetration testing should be conducted to identify similar misconfigurations where test logic persists in production environments, reinforcing a culture of secure software development lifecycle practices.