CVE-2026-118459 in Infantia
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
A time-derived emergency password can be derived from publicly available application code, enabling authentication without legitimate credentials.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a critical failure in the implementation of secure access control mechanisms, specifically within systems relying on time-based or deterministic emergency passwords for administrative recovery or maintenance purposes. This flaw allows an attacker to bypass standard authentication protocols by deriving valid login credentials from publicly accessible application source code rather than possessing legitimate user secrets. The core technical issue lies in the predictability and reversibility of the algorithm used to generate these emergency tokens. When such algorithms are embedded within client-side scripts, open-source libraries, or unobfuscated binaries that can be reverse-engineered, the security boundary collapses because the secret key or seed required for derivation is effectively public knowledge. This scenario aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials and CWE-321: Use of a One-Time Key Twice if the same time window logic allows reuse, but most critically it represents CWE-640: Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Administrators or Accounts. The presence of such a mechanism in publicly viewable code transforms what should be an out-of-band recovery method into a direct authentication vector accessible to any adversary with basic reverse engineering capabilities.
From an operational perspective, the impact of this vulnerability is severe and often catastrophic depending on the privilege level associated with the emergency account. If the derived password grants administrative or root-level access, attackers can gain full control over the affected system, leading to complete data confidentiality loss, integrity compromise through unauthorized modifications, and availability disruption via ransomware deployment or service termination. Even if limited to lower-privilege accounts, this flaw facilitates lateral movement within a network by providing an initial foothold that bypasses multi-factor authentication controls often tied to standard login processes but potentially overlooked for emergency access paths. The attacker does not need to exploit buffer overflows or injection flaws; instead, they simply execute the same logic present in the application code locally to compute valid credentials. This significantly lowers the barrier to entry for exploitation, allowing less sophisticated threat actors to compromise systems that were previously considered secure due to their reliance on complex cryptographic algorithms elsewhere in the architecture.
This type of vulnerability is frequently mapped to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically within the context of Local Accounts or Cloud Accounts where emergency access mechanisms are misconfigured or poorly implemented. It also relates to T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot if used for denial-of-service attacks after gaining access, and potentially T1071: Application Layer Protocol if the derived credentials are used to authenticate over network services like SSH, RDP, or web portals. The fundamental flaw is not necessarily in the cryptographic strength of the algorithm itself but in its deployment context. Security best practices dictate that emergency passwords must never be derivable from application code. Instead, they should be generated using high-entropy random sources and stored securely in a dedicated secrets management solution, such as HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager, with strict access controls requiring physical possession of hardware tokens or multi-party authorization for retrieval.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately audit all emergency access mechanisms across their infrastructure to identify any reliance on deterministic algorithms exposed within application binaries or scripts. The primary remediation strategy involves removing the ability to derive passwords from code entirely. Emergency credentials should be rotated frequently and stored in offline, air-gapped storage solutions that are physically secured and accessible only through strict procedural controls involving multiple authorized personnel. Additionally, implementing multi-factor authentication for all administrative interfaces, including emergency access portals, adds a critical layer of defense-in-depth. If the system architecture allows, replacing static or time-derived passwords with certificate-based authentication or hardware security keys ensures that possession of software code alone is insufficient for unauthorized entry. Regular penetration testing and source code reviews focused on authentication logic are essential to detect such weaknesses before they can be exploited in production environments.