CVE-2026-118450 in Venere
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2026
Venere is installed outside Program Files and loads/registers unsigned components from locations where an unprivileged user may create files.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/09/2026
The vulnerability identified in the Venere software stems from a critical misconfiguration regarding its installation directory and component loading mechanisms, which creates a significant privilege escalation risk through DLL hijacking or binary planting attacks. By installing outside of protected system directories such as Program Files, the application operates within user-writable paths where standard unprivileged users possess full read, write, and execute permissions. This architectural decision fundamentally undermines the operating systems default security boundaries that rely on directory ownership to prevent unauthorized modification of executable code. When an attacker gains access to a low-privilege account on the target system, they can exploit this lack of restrictive file system ACLs by placing malicious dynamic link libraries or executables in directories where Venere searches for its dependencies during startup or runtime initialization.
The technical flaw lies in the application's failure to enforce strict integrity checks or use secure loading practices such as explicit path specification with full directory qualification, which prevents the operating system from searching untrusted locations like the current working directory or user profile folders. Instead of validating the digital signature and hash of loaded components against a known good list, Venere blindly loads unsigned binaries found in these accessible paths. This behavior aligns directly with CWE-427, Uncontrolled Search Path Element, as well as CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection). The absence of code signing requirements for its own components further exacerbates the issue, allowing an attacker to replace legitimate libraries with malicious counterparts that execute arbitrary code within the context of the next user who launches Venere.
From a tactical perspective, this vulnerability maps closely to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1574.002, DLL Search Hijacking, and potentially T1059.001, PowerShell if scripting is involved in the payload delivery chain. An adversary leveraging this flaw can achieve initial code execution with elevated privileges without needing prior admin rights on the machine. The operational impact includes complete system compromise, as the malicious component runs under the context of the user launching Venere, which may be a domain administrator or service account depending on deployment practices. This enables lateral movement, data exfiltration, and persistence establishment within the enterprise network infrastructure.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most effective short-term fix is to reinstall Venere in a protected system directory such as Program Files, where standard users do not have write access by default. Additionally, administrators should apply restrictive Access Control Lists to any remaining installation directories to ensure that only the SYSTEM account or specific service accounts can modify files within those paths. Long-term remediation requires developers to implement secure coding practices including explicit path resolution for all dynamic library loads, enforcing code signing requirements for all internal and third-party components, and utilizing application whitelisting solutions such as Windows Defender Application Control or AppLocker to prevent execution of unsigned binaries from untrusted locations. Regular security audits should also verify that no user-writable paths are included in the system PATH environment variable used by critical applications.