CVE-2026-129703 in vulnerability-lookupinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/16/2026

In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the authentication decorators for feed-key requests (auth_feedkey_func in website/decorators.py) and API-key requests (auth_func in website/web/api/v1/common.py) called Flask-Login's login_user() function. This caused the HTTP response to a request authenticated solely by a feed key (supplied as the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter) or an API key (supplied as the X-API-KEY header) to set a session cookie that grants full authenticated access to every page in the application, without requiring a password or two-factor authentication.

The practical impact is that any party possessing a leaked feed URL (a common occurrence, as feed URLs are shared with RSS readers) or an API key could obtain a valid web session for the associated account. This session provides access to the user's account page, which exposes the API key and other profile data, and for accounts with the administrator role, access to the /admin interface, enabling full administrative control of the application.

The vulnerability affects all users whose feed key or API key is exposed. No prior authentication, user interaction, or special network conditions are required; a single HTTP request with the token is sufficient to establish the session. The session persists until it expires, and because it is not bound to the original credential (a related CWE-613 issue noted by the developers), revoking the feed key or API key does not invalidate the already-created session.

The fix replaces the login_user() call with assignment to g._login_user, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads for the current request only, without writing any session cookie. The affected views remain unchanged and continue to see the authenticated user for the single request.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026

A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists within a web application that improperly utilizes Flask-Login’s login_user function during API-based requests. Specifically, decorators handling feed-key verification in website/decorators.py and API-key verification in website/web/api/v1/common.py invoke this session-establishing method when processing HTTP requests authenticated via the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter or the X-API-KEY header. This architectural flaw causes the application to issue a persistent session cookie upon successful authentication, effectively granting full web-based access to the user’s account without requiring traditional password entry or two-factor authentication verification. The vulnerability stems from treating API-level credentials as equivalent to interactive login events, thereby bypassing intended security controls that rely on multi-step authentication processes for sensitive operations and administrative privileges.

The operational impact of this flaw is severe, allowing any entity possessing a leaked feed URL or an exposed API key to hijack the associated user session. Feed URLs are frequently shared with RSS readers and third-party aggregators, increasing the likelihood of credential exposure through logs, browser history, or network sniffing. Once authenticated via these tokens, attackers gain access to the user’s profile page, where they can extract additional sensitive data including other API keys. For accounts holding administrative roles, this vulnerability provides unrestricted control over the application interface at /admin, enabling complete compromise of system integrity and data confidentiality. This represents a significant escalation from simple information disclosure to full account takeover with potential for broader infrastructure impact depending on the application’s scope.

From a technical perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-613 regarding Insufficient Session Expiration, as well as CWE-287 which covers Improper Authentication. The session created is not bound to the specific credential used for authentication; consequently, revoking or rotating the feed key or API key does not invalidate existing sessions established prior to the change. This persistence allows attackers to maintain access even after credentials are compromised and rotated, necessitating additional mitigation steps beyond simple token rotation. Furthermore, the lack of binding between the session cookie and the original request context violates fundamental principles of secure state management in web applications.

The remediation strategy involves modifying the authentication decorators to avoid calling login_user entirely for API-based requests. Instead, the fix assigns the authenticated user object directly to g._login_user, a variable that Flask-Login’s current_user property reads exclusively within the scope of the single HTTP request. This approach ensures that views continue to recognize the authenticated identity for processing logic while preventing the creation of persistent session cookies or browser-side state changes. By decoupling API authentication from web session management, the application maintains functional integrity for backend services while eliminating the attack vector that allowed unauthorized full-session establishment. Organizations should also implement strict cookie attributes such as HttpOnly and Secure flags where applicable, enforce short-lived sessions, and consider implementing mutual TLS or stricter origin validation to further reduce exposure risks associated with leaked credentials.

Responsible

CIRCL

Reservation

11/16/2026

Disclosure

11/16/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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